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Abstract 
This dissertation will show why Germany is overall on a better way to deliver secure and 
sustainable electricity to its population at the moment. Though, New Zealand had the 
better starting point, it missed important steps in the development. However, “of the 
industrial countries, Germany is leading with regard to new renewable energy sources, 
occupying one of the first ranks in terms of wind energy capacity and photovoltaics”.1 Its 
legislation on this area with the core the Renewable Sources Act is a role model for many 
countries. And Germany’s Integrated Energy and Climate Programme seems promising 
that Germany will continue to have innovative and exemplary measures on the renewable 
energy sector.  
However, the history and development of New Zealand’s electricity market has shown 
that its government can correct wrong decisions and react fast and forcefully. The New 
Zealand Energy Strategy and the New Zealand Efficiency and Conservation Strategy 
have been first steps in the right direction. An important sign for New Zealand’s 
electricity industry would be the National Policy Statement for Renewable Electricity 
Generation.  
 
 
I INTRODUCTION 
The significance of renewable energy is growing all over the world. Unlike 
fossil fuels (e.g. coal, gas, oil), renewable energy is derived from natural processes that 
are replenished constantly. In its various forms, “it derives either from the sun, like wind, 
hydro, biomass and solar, or from heat, generated deep within the earth, like geothermal 
resources”.2 The second big advantage is that the electricity generation from renewable 
sources hardly produces any greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) which are responsible for 
the climate change. Therefore the Ministry for Environment stated that:3  
 
The contribution of renewable electricity generation, regardless of scale, towards 
addressing the effects of climate change plays a vital role in the wellbeing of New Zealand, 
its people and the environment. In considering the risks and opportunities associated with 
various electricity futures, New Zealand’s government has determined that 90 per cent of 
electricity generated in should come from renewable energy sources by 2025.  
 
                                               
1 Volkmar Lauber and Lutz Merz “Three decades of renewable electricity policies in Germany” Energy and 
Environment, (2004) 15 no 4, 610. 
2 < www.wikipedia.org> (last accessed: 31.10.2008) 
3 MfE Proposed National Policy Statement For Renewable Electricity Generation (Wellington, August 
2008), preamble. 
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Germany’s newest objective, as in the RES Act 2009, is to increase the share of 
renewable energy sources in elecvtricty supply to at least 30 per cent by 2020. 
This dissertation will show the different steps both countries have taken in order 
to tackle the challenges of the 21st century with regard to electricity market, delivering 
secure and sustainable electricity. Chapter II and III will illustrate the different starting 
points of these both countries and which reforms have been taken in order to liberalise 
the market at first and in a further step to prepare it for a future. Therefore, in order to get 
a sufficient overview, it is necessary to describe the history and the development of New 
Zealand’s and Germany’s electricity markets. Consequently, this dissertation will 
illustrate and discuss the most important reform steps concerning the electricity markets 
in New Zealand (part II) and in Germany (part III). Additionally, this work will give a 
quite detailed overview over the attitude of the both countries towards renewable energy 
sources (but only in connection with electricity generation). In this connection, different 
incentive programme and renewable energy technology as well as the regulation of 
renewables will be scrutinised. 
In the concluding part IV, current statistics and the most important results, 
compiled in part II and III of this dissertation, will be presented and compared. This will 
happen in two steps. First, the general electricity market reforms will be compared and 
evaluated. Finally, reforms concerning renewable electricity and future measures will be 
discussed, resulting in the answer which of these both countries to provide its population 
with reliable and low emission electricity in the future. 
 
  
II NEW ZEALAND 
A New Zealand’s Early History  
1 The beginning of New Zealand’s electrification 
New Zealand’s history of “electrification began in the late 19th century, when 
local authorities and private entrepreneurs constructed small generation facilities to serve 
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local markets.”4 In the 1920s, the Government started with the “construction of a set of 
large state-owned hydroelectric plants on major rivers.”5 These plants were linked by a 
“transmission grid from which power was taken off by local government distribution and 
retail companies, the so called ESAs (Electrical Supply Authorities).”6 Each of these 
Authorities had a “territorial monopoly franchise in running low-voltage distribution 
networks, retailing electricity to final customers, and supplying and servicing household 
electrical appliances.”7 
 
The state-owned generation and transmission system, built up from this time, displaced 
most locally owned generating plants and remained a state-owned monopoly for the next 
half century, while distribution and retail remained franchised and publicly owned local 
monopolies. Regulation in this setting was unnecessary, since both central and local 
government were democratically accountable, and operated the electricity supply system 
with social, rather than commercial, goals. Prices were set to achieve break even over the 
long run.8  
 
The business policy resembled a social service policy and focused on public 
welfare rather than being a profit orientated organisation. Investment behaviour was 
motivated by political reasons and not by economic or technical needs, and also by 
conflict between social and commercial objectives, political interference.9 
But this “state-funded welfare system with provisions for universal social 
security including education, housing and health services together with a wide range of 
government-run and often subsidised, utility services”, all funded out of general taxation, 
could only work as long as NZ economy was prospering.10 
                                               
4 Geoff Bertram ”Restructuring the New Zealand Electricity Sector 1984-2005” in Fereidoon P. Siohansi 
and Wolfgang Pfaffenberger (ed) Electricity Market Reform: An International Perspective (Elsevier, 
Oxford, 2006) 203. 
5 Ibid, 204 
6 Ibid. 
7.Ibid 
8 Ibid. 
9 Alexander Ehlert Development and Regulation in the New Zealand and German Electricity Industries 
(LLM research Paper, Victoria University of Wellington, 2005) 20. 
10 Alan Bollard and Michael Pickford “Utility Regulation in New Zealand“ in Michael E. Beesley (ed) 
Regulating Utilities: Broadening the Debate (IEA, London, 1997) 75, 77. 
9 
 
2 The turning point 
After Second World War between 60 and 70 per cent of all New Zealand exports 
went to Britain. This “assured preferential access to the British market allowed New 
Zealand considerable prosperity and by 1953 the country enjoyed what was probably the 
third highest standard of living in the world.”11 
 
 But the year 1973 marked a turning point in New Zealand’s economic fortunes. 
In this year Britain joined the European Community, resulting in access for New Zealand 
exports becoming increasingly restricted. At the same time the economy was also badly 
affected by the large international oil price raises in 1973/74 and 1979.12 Despite this bad 
economic situation the demand of New Zealanders in social services increased and due to 
an additional “lax monetary policy the public debt of New Zealand grew sevenfold” in the 
decade from 1975 on.13 
 
At that time electricity utilities were large and inefficient statutory monopolies. 
The State Owned Enterprises (SOE) produced an overall outcome of 10 per cent of the 
country against 20 per cent of total investment.14 A department of the Ministry of Energy, 
the New Zealand Electricity Division (NZED), previously known as the State Hydro-
Electric Department15, operated most of the generation and transmission capacities and 
supplied wholesale power at an average-cost price (the so-called bulk supply tariff). 
Retail was administered by the ESAs, which were organised in Municipal Electricity 
Departments or Electric Power Boards with guaranteed retail areas.16 
By the earl eighties there was a consensus about the need for change in the 
direction of economic policy in the business community amongst political pressure 
groups and in the Treasury.17 
 
                                               
11 See supra n 10, 76. 
12 Ibid, 77. 
13 Ibid, 78. 
14 Brian Easton The Commercialisation of New Zealand (Auckland University Press, Auckland 1997) 7. 
15 But this department only existed from 1948 to 1956. 
16 See supra n 9, 20. 
17 See supra n 10, 78. 
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B The Reform Process from 1984 - 1993 
With the election win of the Labour Party in the year 1984, neoliberal economic 
doctrines (largely copied from the UK) were adopted, resulting in radical changes to all 
state-owned operations, including electricity. The basic thrust of the reform programme 
was to free the market mechanism from distorting government controls and subsidies. 
The emphasis was on allowing the “forces of enterprise, self-interest, and competition to 
generate efficiency and economic growth.”18 The key features of the reform were “the 
removal of nearly all statutory rights in order to expose utilities to competition, 
corporatisation and the unbundling of competitive and monopoly parts as well as the 
abolishment of funding relating to social service obligation.”19 The aims were to ensure 
that state-owned monopolies would increase their profitability by raising their prices to 
contribute to reducing the government’s budget and the raise of economic efficiency of 
state-owned operations by converting them into profit-oriented commercial corporate 
organisations.20  
1 The State-Owned Enterprise Act 1986 and its consequences 
“In 1986, the government announced its decision to reform its trading activities, 
including the generation and transmission sectors of the electricity industry, and the 
State-Owned Enterprises (SOE) Act was passed to govern the process of 
corporatisation.”21 The Ministry of Economic Development explained that:22  
 
The SOE Act was a component of the government’s moves to improve the performance 
and accountability of the public sector. SOEs are companies in which nominated Ministers 
hold all the shares, and the enterprises negotiate annual Statements of Corporate Intent 
with shareholding Ministers. They operate with commercial structures and incentives and 
with the principal objective of being successful businesses.  
                                               
18 See supra n 10, 79. 
19 Alan Bollard „Utility Regulation In New Zealand“ (ACCC Training Program on Utility Regulation, 
November 1997) 2. 
20 See supra n 4, 208. 
21 Ibid. 
22 MED Chronology of New Zealand Electricity Reform  <www.med.govt.nz> (last accessed: 31.10.2008). 
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In April 1987 then, the NZED was converted into the Electricity Corporation of 
New Zealand Ltd (ECNZ). “The ECNZ was set up as a company under the SOE Act, to 
own and operate the generation and transmission assets. Policy and regulatory activities 
were separated out and largely retained in the Ministry of Energy.”23 The following year 
the operation of the transmission grid was transferred to a new ECNZ subsidiary, 
Transpower Ltd, and the first step towards the separation of generation from transmission 
was taken. 
2 The recommendations of the Electricity Task Force and its consequences 
 In December 1987, the government set up an Electricity Task Force, comprised 
from members from the government departments, the ECNZ and the ESAs, to advise on 
the new industry structure and regulatory requirements. The Task Force recommended 
three major reform steps in September 1989:  Firstly, the establishment of a competitive 
generation market by minimising generation entry barriers and by exploring a regulatory 
rule against price discrimination by ECNZ. “Further study of a limited generation break-
up and the creation of a wholesale market (subject to this, ECNZ should be privatised)”24 
were also discussed. Secondly, the Transpower grid should be separated from the ECNZ. 
The idea was that distributors and generators should form a club to own the transmission 
grid. And thirdly, the introduction of competition at the retail market in deregulating the 
ESAs by corporatisation and removal of statutory protective rights.25 
“The last of these recommendations, namely no price regulation, and adoption of 
a light-handed approach to regulation in general, was wholeheartedly adopted by the 
government” which believed that the danger of market power abuse and its problems 
could be solved without an “industry regulator solely on general competition law: the 
Commerce Act 1986.”26 
First effects of these recommendations could be noticed in 1990. In May, the 
government announced that the ESAs would be corporatised and in August the Electric 
Power Boards Amendment Act 1990 passed, allowing the government to appoint new 
                                               
23 See supra n 22. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid. 
26 See supra n 4, 210. 
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ESA commercial board members, who would later direct the new retail companies, 
whereas the old elected board members became trustees of the firms.27 
 
In 1991, the Energy Sector Reform Bill was introduced to the parliament. This bill 
contained provisions facilitating the corporatisation of ESAs and a wide range of 
regulatory measures. The bill was later split to become five separate Acts, including the 
Energy Companies Act 1992 and the Electricity Act 1992.28 
 
“The Energy Companies Act 1992 finally forced all ESAs to corporatise their 
operations, moving to a commercial company structure with shareholders and profit 
objectives.”29 The Electricity Act 1992, which came into effect in April 1993, provided 
for deregulation, “more precisely the removal of distributors’ statutory monopolies and of 
the obligation to supply”. 30 Furthermore, it had provisions for information disclosure 
(focused particularly on natural monopolies), “safety matters and land access as well as 
temporary provision for price control for domestic consumers”.31  
But the effects of the reforms were minor as the incumbents continued to behave 
as they had it done before the reform process.32  
3 Fist steps to a Wholesale Electricity Market 
Following electricity shortages in 1992, the government set up a task force, the 
Wholesale Electricity Market Development Group (WEDMG) to “examine how a 
wholesale electricity market could be established as a means of producing efficient 
pricing signals for investment in new generating capacity and to facilitate the entry of 
new generators”.33 This WEDMG’s “terms of reference included the development of 
specific, cost effective proposals for developing a wholesale electricity market” which 
should ensure that wholesale electricity is “consistent with sustainable development and 
                                               
27 See supra n 9, 22. 
28 See supra n 22. 
29 See supra n 4, 216. 
30 See supra n 22 
31 Ibid. 
32 To be seen in the course of this chapter 
33 See supra n 10, 111. 
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delivered at the lowest cost to the economy.”34 In 1993, the Electricity Market Company, 
subsequently renamed Market Place Company, (M-co) was set up by key players in the 
electricity industry at the behest of the government.35 According to the MED:36 
 
Its role was to support the electricity market framework for wholesale trading. Key steps 
to this aim were the commencement of an online secondary market in trading of ECNZ’s 
hedge contracts, the establishment of a market surveillance committee in order to admit 
new entrants and supervise conduct, as well as the administration of the Metering and 
Reconciliation Information Agreement (MARIA)37 to record and reconcile flows to meet 
the needs of parties contracting in the wholesale and retail markets.  
 
1993 was also the year of the so-called First Franchise Removal, which was “the 
first stage of the removal of statutory distribution and retail monopolies (and the 
obligation to supply), allowing competition for sales to retail consumers.”38 In May, “the 
government announced its decision to separate Transpower from ECNZ. The planned 
club ownership39 was found to be difficult to implement, so the government decided to set 
up Transpower as a stand-alone Crown-owned company”. 40 But the next year, which 
turned out to be a very important one for New Zealand’s electricity market, changed this 
plan again. 
 
C The Reform Process from 1994 - 2001 
1 1994: Year of change 
In 1994, major steps were taken to liberalise New Zealand’s electricity market. 
Firstly, in April the Second Franchise Removal took place. The First Franchise Removal 
“allowed the supply companies already to sell customers anywhere, up to a limit of 0.5 
                                               
34 See supra n 22. 
35 For further details; see supra n 10, 112. 
36 See supra n 22 
37 MARIA governed the industry from 1 October 1996 to 1 March 2004. 
38 MED 
39 Compare n 25. 
40 See supra n 22. 
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gigawatt-hours per customer per year.”41 In this second stage “the restriction on customer 
size was lifted, giving free scope for all customers to purchase electricity from any supply 
company.”42 
“In July 1994, generation was fully separated from transmission, leaving ECNZ 
with generation while the transmission grid company Transpower became an independent 
SOE43, charged with operating the grid and scheduling the dispatch of generators.”44 
There was then the possibility to split ECNZ into smaller companies which could 
compete on the generation market and also could be sold more easily.45 This development 
was also supported by the introduction of the Electricity (Information Disclosure) 
Regulations 1994 46  which required public disclosure of information and focussed 
particularly on the natural monopolies in the industry (distribution and transmission). The 
regulations featured “financial separation” of natural monopoly (distribution lines) and 
competitive activities (retailing and generation) with common ownership. Information 
relating to line charges became available to all consumers, plus further information on 
prices and other key conditions of contract. Separate audited financial statements and 
separate pricing were also required for local distribution activities to ensure that 
distribution was operating transparently.47 
In August 1994, the WEDMG recommended in its final report the earliest 
establishment of a competitive wholesale market as well as of a voluntary pool and spot 
market, operated by a neutral entity. The Group further recommended a separate grid, 
long-term tradable wholesale contracts, a levy to promote energy efficiency and 
conservation, and restrictions on ECNZ market power. 48 
                                               
41 See supra n 10, 113. 
42 Ibid. 
43 The government amended its previous announcement. Compare with n 39. 
44 See supra n 4, 211. 
45 See supra n 9, 22. 
46 Came into force in July 1994, were revised 1999 and subsequently revoked on 6 April 2004. 
47  Paula Rebstock “The New Zealand Experience in Utility Regulation” (Australian Competition and 
Consumer Commission Regulatory Conference, 30 July 2004) 4. 
48 Ibid. 
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2 The Wholesale Electricity Market 
The following year, the government answered these recommendations with “its 
provisional announcements on the steps it would take in the lead up to the opening of the 
wholesale electricity market.”49 Besides “a five year fund of NZ$18 million to support 
energy efficiency in the domestic sector”, the main focus of the government was to end 
the monopoly of the ECNZ. Their plans included to split ECNZ into two competing 
SOEs, namely ECNZ and Contact Energy50. Furthermore, ECNZ’s proposals for the new 
Taranaki plant and “six small hydro plants owned by ECNZ were to be sold”.51 
In the beginning of 1996, “Contact Energy commenced operations as an SOE 
generator, in competition with ECNZ. Contact Energy took on seven52 former ECNZ 
power stations” 53 , which represented 22 per cent of New Zealand’s total electricity 
production at this time. Contact Energy also took over ECNZ’s contracts for Maui gas. A 
set of special restraints (cap on building new capacity, ring-fencing new capacity, and 
high level of firm capacity to be offered by tender for long term contracts) was applied to 
ECNZ until such time as its market share fell below 45 per cent.54 In April 1996 ECNZ 
had still about two-thirds of the country’s generating capacity left.55 
In October, the “wholesale electricity market started under a multilateral 
contract, the New Zealand Electricity Market (NZEM). M-co was contracted to act as 
Market Administrator, Clearing Manager and Pricing Manager. Transpower took the 
roles of the Scheduler and Dispatcher.”56 Supply companies and large industrial users 
were now able to choose between competing, and possible new entrant, power generators 
– or building their own generating capacity – in order to get better deals. The electricity 
prices were calculated every 30 minutes “based on bids and offers from market 
participants (i.e. generators, purchasers and traders).”57  
                                               
49 See supra n 22. 
50 Which was known as “EC-2” at this time. 
51 See supra n 22. 
52 The power stations at Roxburgh, Clyde, New Plymouth, Wairakei, Ohaaki, Otahuhu, Stratford and 
Whirinaki. 
53 See supra n 22. 
54 Ibid. 
55 See supra n 10, 111. 
56 See supra n 22. 
57 For further details on the calculation of the final price see supra n 4, 214. 
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However, it soon became clear that the establishment of the wholesale electricity 
market and greater transparency in pricing did not meet the expectation to check 
sufficiently on monopoly power. The local electricity companies still focused on their 
natural monopolies and had both the ability and incentive to use their market power in 
distribution to exclude competition at the retail level. They also controlled the hedge 
market products to the detriment of independent retailers and traders, which could not get 
transparent prices under fair conditions to secure their potential business risks. In cross-
subsiding retail prices with the profit from the distribution network businesses, the big 
players also dumped the prices for pure energy so new retailers could not break into this 
market. 58  And the main problem in the wholesale market was that ECNZ was still 
dominant in the spot and contract markets. In addition, the set of special restraints on 
ECNZ expanding or exercising its dominance were likely to be ineffective over time.59 
 
3 The Electricity Industry Reform Act 1998  
The consequence of the –in the last chapter described- development was that the 
government decided that its earlier warning, issued in 1995 in its Policy Statement60, had 
not been heeded. In this GPS, it was held that the government would seriously consider 
requiring the ownership of line business to be separated from ownership of competition 
activities (such as generation and energy retailing) if there is a clear and consistent 
pattern of abuse of naturally monopoly line businesses. The government’s response was 
to introduce and pass in a matter of weeks – “the bill was introduced to parliament on 19 
May and received the Royal Assent on 8 July 1998”61  -the Electricity Industry Reform 
Act 1998. Patterson stated that: 62 
 
                                               
58 See supra 47, 5/6. 
59 MED New Zealand’s Electricity Reform Package - A Better Deal for Electricity Consumers (Wellington, 
April 1998) 
60  MED Government Policy Statement - Wholesale Electricity Reform, Regulation of Electricity Line 
Businesses  (Wellington, June 1995). 
61 Ross Patterson “Utility Regulation in New Zealand: From Light-Handed to Many-Handed (Australian 
Competition and Consumer Commission Regulatory Conference, 30 July 2004) 12. 
62 Ibid. 
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The key feature of the Act was the mandatory separation of the monopoly business from the contestable 
retail/power generation businesses. Companies were required to divest their distribution or supply business 
within five years and operate as separate corporations in the interim.  
 
Further aspired distribution and retail reforms were the strengthening of information 
disclosure requirements in order to provide for a greater level of information which was 
more readily understandable to ordinary customers63, the need for a low cost system to 
enable consumers to switch electricity suppliers and the increased threat of price control 
on the monopoly line businesses. In addition, the government announced its decision to 
split ECNZ into three SOEs. 64   
In April 1999, the ECNZ split was carried through. New Zealand’s largest 
electricity generator was split into three competing state-owned generators. The new 
companies were Genesis Power Ltd, Meridian Energy Ltd and Mighty River Power Ltd. 
 
In a series of steps from 1996 to 1999, the larger ECNZ generation assets were split up 
among four successor companies: Contact Energy and the three above mentioned: while 
the smaller ECNZ stations (plus a number of other generation plants formerly owned by 
supply authorities) were privatised by sale to Trustpower, Todd Energy and two smaller 
operations owned by Natural Gas Corporation and Tuaropaki Power. Contact Energy was 
privatised by a share float between March and May 1999; the other three large successor 
companies remained state owned.65 
   
Also, in April 1999 the electricity industry complied with the requirement of the 
government’s 1998 electricity reforms to establish a “system for switching electricity 
retailers. They launched a profiling system that enabled consumers to switch electricity 
retailers easily. The system was part of MARIA66 and administered by the wholesale 
market administrator M-co”.67  
Overall, the Electricity Industry Reform Act stimulated a frantic round of 
commercial activity as companies determined whether to divest their line businesses or 
                                               
63 The Information Disclosure Regulations were revised in April 1999 (see also n 46). 
64 See supra n 58. 
65 See supra n 4, 211. 
66 Compare n 37. 
67 See supra n 22. 
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their generation retail assets. In the space of 12 months, 1.1 million customers changed 
suppliers whilst five network companies changed ownership. As a consequence the 
wholesale electricity prices fell. But whilst the reforms resulted in savings to industrial 
and commercial customers, domestic customers experienced further price raises within 
the first four days after the reforms came into effect.68 
4 The Ministerial Inquiry into the Electricity Industry and its outcome 
In order to ensure that also the consumers benefited from the reforms, the 
incoming government (Labour-led centre-left elected in 1999) announced a ministerial 
inquiry into the electricity industry on 3 February 2000. It should consider what changes 
were needed to ensure New Zealanders have the best possible electricity system. “The 
inquiry panel supported continuation of the self-regulation approach, but recommended 
further evolution of the existing arrangements in the electricity industry as well as 
introduction of targeted price control for electricity line businesses.”69 
The government decided to follow the ministerial inquiry’s recommendations 
and accepted them, “either directly or in a modified form”. On 3 October 2000, it 
“announced a comprehensive policy package designed to deliver fairness and 
transparency for electricity consumers. And finally, on 7 December 2000 the government 
released the final version of its policy statement.”70 “The government’s overall objective 
was to ensure that electricity is delivered in an efficient, fair, reliable and 
environmentally sustainable manner to all classes of consumers.”71 
The government accepted almost in their entirety a set of recommendations 
concerning new self-regulatory arrangements made by the inquiry panel. It recommended 
that the three existing industry governance structures (NZEM, MARIA and the relatively 
new MACQS72) be merged into one Electricity Governance Board (EGB), with wider 
membership and wider responsibilities. Membership should include the local distribution 
                                               
68 See supra n 61, 13. 
69 See supra 47, 6/7. 
70  MED Government Policy Statement: Further Development of New Zealand’s Electricity Industry 
(Wellington, December 2000). 
71 Ibid. 
72 The Multilateral Agreement on Common Quality Standards, an industry self-governing arrangement (just 
like NZEM and MARIA), concerning the operation of the national transmission grid, evolving from 1998.  
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companies and Transpower, and the rules should be binding on them.73 The EGB should 
have a majority of independent directors, which should be appointed after consultation 
with the Minister of Energy. Furthermore, the EGB should have a number of 
responsibilities beyond running the wholesale market. It should ensure that rules are 
developed in the areas of transmission (organisation of a transmission pricing 
methodology in negotiation with Transpower), distribution (terms and conditions for 
connection of distributed generation to distribution lines), retail (establishment of a 
consumer complaints system and retailer insolvency measures) and governance 
(enforcement including alternative dispute resolution and an effective independent 
surveillance body).74 
As long as the government’s objectives were met, it was happy for the industry 
to find ways to do so through self-regulation and internal governance, as it had been 
happy in the past. But this time legislation was introduced in order to ensure statutory 
backup power for the government.75 
5 The Electricity Industry Bill 2000 
 The new government’s policy was to have industry solutions where “possible 
and regulatory solutions where necessary”.76 Therefore, the Electricity Industry Bill was 
tabled in Parliament on 28 November 2000. “The bill was enacted on 7 August 2001 and 
amended four statutes: the Ministry of Energy Abolition Act 1989, the Commerce Act 
1986, the Electricity Act 1992, and the Electricity Industry Reform Act 1998.”77  
One key feature of the bill was the introduction of part IVA of the Commerce 
Act, empowering the Commerce Commission to impose direct price control on 
transmission and distribution line businesses in case of breached thresholds, established 
by the Commission, and to carry out a review of valuation methodologies for line 
business assets as well as to administer information disclosure requirements for line 
businesses. Furthermore, the Electricity Amendment Act 2001 allowed the Minister of 
                                               
73 Barry Barton “Self-Regulation, State regulation, and Co-Regulation in Energy in New Zealand” in Barry 
Barton et al (ed) Regulating Energy and Natural Resources (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006) 139. 
74 See supra n 70, no 7. 
75 See supra n 73, 139. 
76 See supra n 70, no 2. 
77 See supra n 22. 
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Energy to recommend regulations to be made by Order in Council which would require 
retailers to offer certain tariff options, and to regulate the terms and conditions on which 
lines businesses services are supplied to low end consumers. 78  It also allowed the 
government to establish an Electricity Governance Board, if the industry would fail to 
establish an EGB; or in the case of negative reports would be received on the EGB 
established by the electricity sector.79 
Finally, the Electricity Industry Reform Amendment Act 2001 “slightly relaxed 
the rules on ownership of electricity generation by lines companies and permitted to own 
and sell (in unlimited quantities) the output of generation from new renewable energy 
sources.”80 
D 2002-2004: End of the light handed regulation 
1 The failed referendum of the industry 
The industry responded positively to the challenge of further self regulation and 
established the Electricity Governance Establishment Project (EGEP) in October 2000 
which set up a committee chaired by David Caygill, a former cabinet minister who had 
also chaired the Ministerial Inquiry81. The Committee realised some of the ideas proposed 
by the Government Policy Statement82 between April and July 2002. It developed inter 
alia “a regime for the disclosure of hydro spill by major generators” and “an index for 
fixed price electricity contracts”. 83  In the course of 2001, it also negotiated a new 
rulebook with industry players, and by September 2002, it had secured Commerce 
Commission approval. The Establishment Committee had resolved to conduct a formal 
referendum of the industry on the rulebook to establish the new EGB. One third of the 
voting right were allocated to the traders (generating companies and retailers), one third 
to the transporters (distributors and Transpower), and one third to consumers. There was 
no legal obligation or even any government direction to conduct a referendum, but the 
                                               
78 See supra n 61, 15. 
79 See supra n 22. 
80 Ibid. 
81 Compare chapter II C 4. 
82 Compare n 70 . 
83 See supra n 22. 
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measure would have increased the legitimacy. 84  On 16 May 2003 the results of the 
referendum were announced. Only the traders voted with a majority for the referendum 
(66, 2 per cent). Amongst the other groups the referendum was clearly rejected (e.g. only 
4, 4 per cent of the consumers voted for the proposal). As there was not a substantial 
majority of all classes in favour of the proposal the referendum was not implemented. 
2 The take over by the government 
This disappointment came right in the middle of an energy security problem: a 
dry winter for New Zealand’s hydro electric system. The government announced 
immediately that it would set up a statutory agency to take care of both problems.85 
According to a cabinet paper from 20 May 2003: 86 
 
A new Electricity Commission should be established to take over governance of the electricity industry. 
The Commission should secure reserve generation to ensure New Zealand’s electricity needs can be met 
even in very dry years without power savings campaigns.  
 
To reach this public policy objective the ministers suggested the Electricity 
Commission should have the power to contract for dry year reserves with generation 
companies, to “set minimum requirements on generators” with regard to “dry year 
reserves” and offering “long term contracts” to retailers and major electricity users.87 
 Furthermore, the government announced in July 2003 “that a new 155 
megawatt oil-fired power plant should be built to help provide increased certainty of 
electricity supply.”88 The Whirinaki Reserve Generation Plant was finally commissioned 
on 1 June 2004. It should “only run when the limits of the electricity system were tested 
by problems such as low inflows to the hydro lakes or a major generation or transmission 
breakdown.”89   
                                               
84 See supra n 73, 140. 
85 Ibid. 
86 Cabinet Paper “Electricity Security of Supply: Policy Settings” (01 May 2003) CAB (03) 29. 
87 Ibid. 
88 See supra n 22. 
89 Ibid. 
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In September 2003, “the government announced further details of their reserve 
generation policy. The Electricity Commission was expected to contract for low fixed 
cost options for reserve energy”. 90  “New generation plants and plants that would 
otherwise be mothballed or retired would both be eligible to be considered for reserve 
energy”.91 In addition it was suggested, that “the Commission should contract with large 
electricity users for demand reductions as part of the reserve energy portfolio”. 92  
Simultaneously, the Electricity Commission (at the time of its establishment still formally 
known as the Electricity Governance Board) was established and began operating on 15 
September 2003.  
3 The Electricity Commission  
The government had decided to exercise the powers available under part 15 of 
the Electricity Amendment Act 2001.93 In doing so, the government had to give up its 
preferred position of a self-governing solution of the industry. But apart from failing to 
design an adequate self regulation, the industry had also failed to ensure future electricity 
supply and modernisation which was a significant risk for New Zealand’s sustainable 
economic growth.94 
Therefore, the principal objective of the Electricity Commission was and still is 
“to ensure that electricity is produced and delivered to all classes of consumers in an 
efficient, fair, reliable and environmentally sustainable manner”.95 Under the Electricity 
Governance Regulations and Rules 2003 the Commission finally took over the running of 
the wholesale electricity market from the industry’s NZEM and MARIA on 1 March 
2004 and became the specialised industry regulator which it is till now. 
                                               
90 See supra n 22. 
91 Ibid 
92 Ibid. 
93 See supra n 73, 142 and Palairet 35: Part 15 subpart1 of the Electricity Act 1992, inserted by the 
Electricity Amendment Act 2001, was brought into force by the Electricity (Commencement of Electricity 
Governance Board) Order 2003 (SR 2003/200). The Electricity Governance Regulations 2003 were made 
by Order in Council on 15 December 2003. They came into force on 16 December 2004. The Electricity 
Governance Rules were gazetted by the Minister of Energy on 18 December 2003, and they came into 
force on 1 March 2004 
94 See supra n 9, 30. 
95 According to section 172 N of the Electricity Act which was substituted by section 15 Electricity 
Amendment Act 2004 (2004 No 80) on 18 October 2004. The Commission is also now required to promote 
and facilitate the efficient use of electricity (section 172 N (1) (b)). 
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Further statutory amendments were thought necessary, and were introduced into 
parliament in October 2003 as the Electricity and Gas Industries Bill, becoming in due 
course the Electricity Amendment Act 2004 and the Gas Amendment Act 2004. The 
amendments gave the focus on energy security in determining the Electricity 
Commission to ensure the security of supply and the consumer protection. The electricity 
amendments also did away with the provisions that left the Commission as a mere backup 
in case self-regulation did not work.96 “The bill also amended the Electricity Industry 
Reform Act to ease restrictions on lines companies owning electricity generation.”97 
The bill was criticised for stating unclear multiple objectives and multiple roles 
for the Commission; as policy advisor, regulator, enforcer, adjudicator, decider of 
Transpower’s commercial transactions, provider of market operations, and provider of 
reserve power. Also criticised were the breadth of the Commission’s regulatory powers, 
its likely cost, and its lack of independence from the Minister of Energy. Furthermore, it 
was argued that price control of local distribution and transmission under part 4A of the 
Commerce Act should not be transferred to it from the Commerce Commission.98 
4 The Government Policy Statement (GPS) on Electricity Governance 
To end the uncertainty of the role of the Electricity Commission and set its 
direction, the government published a new GPS on Electricity Governance in October 
2004. It confirmed the key role of the Commission which should contribute to sustainable 
economic growth by organising a reliable, resilient and environmentally responsible 
electricity system. The GPS set out the priority of the Electricity Commission as to “work 
with all stakeholder groups to ensure that” New Zealand will “achieve an appropriate 
level of security of supply” for a modern security (e.g. by building a “sufficient 
generation capacity or making energy efficiency improvements to meet ongoing demand 
growth”, implementing a sufficient reserve energy mechanism “to cope with extreme dry 
sequences or other unexpected supply disruptions”). 99  Further priorities of the 
Commission, stipulated by the GPS, were the improvement of the hedge market 
                                               
96 See supra n 73, 142. 
97 See supra n 22. 
98 See supra n 73, 142. 
99 MED Government Policy Statement on Electricity Governance (Wellington, October 2004) s 35/36. 
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transparency and liquidity in order to create a more efficient wholesale market, and the 
determination of common standards for the national grid.100 Primarily, the “Electricity 
Commission should ensure that the interests of end consumers are properly taken into 
account and cooperate with Transpower and the grid users to facilitate investment in the 
grid.”101 
The government set also out its “expectations and intentions regarding the 
disputed interrelationship between the Commerce Commission and the Electricity 
Commission.”102 It acknowledged that both Commissions would have responsibilities and 
powers “with regard to the regulation of Transpower and electricity lines businesses (the 
Commerce Commission under the Commerce Act 1986 and the Electricity Commission 
under the Electricity Act 1992).”103 And it recognised that it was almost inevitable that 
the functions of both commissions would affect one another. So the government 
demanded that the both “commissions would work closely together to ensure a good 
coordination of their respective roles, and to minimise any scope for uncertainties.”104 In 
respect of the optimisation of regulatory jurisdiction and transparency of communication 
and decision processes, the Commerce Act had been amended in order to transfer the 
responsibility for Transpower at any time and for other large electricity lines businesses 
not before 1 April 2009 by Order in Council from the Commerce Commission solely to 
the Electricity Commission.105 The principle jurisdiction on network issues is still at the 
Commerce Commission. By doing so, the legislator met recommendations of the industry 
which had a solid history with the Commerce Commission. However, issues relating to 
security of supply and transmission investment decisions are now the responsibility of the 
Electricity Commission. Therefore, the transfer of the complete jurisdiction for all 
network related businesses from the Commerce Commission seemed reasonable. 
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103 Ibid, s 101. 
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In the GPS, the government set a further policy objective for the Electricity 
Commission which will be scrutinised in the next chapter: the uptake of renewable 
electricity generation.106  
 
E The Uptake of Renewable Energy 
1 The starting point: Energy Policy Framework and its consequences 
In October 2000, a revised Energy Policy Framework was released, in which the 
government committed itself “to a sustainable and efficient energy future. Within this 
commitment, its overall objective was to ensure the delivery of energy services to all 
classes of consumer in an efficient, fair, reliable, and sustainable manner.”107 Objectives 
relating energy efficiency and renewable energy as well as climate change were set and in 
the following, the outcome will be shown: 
(a) Energy Efficiency and Conservation Act 2000 and its strategy 
The Act passed and set as its purpose the promotion of energy efficiency, energy 
conservation, and the use of renewable sources of energy. Section 8 ensured the 
preparation and draft of a National Energy Efficiency and Conservation Strategy 
(NCEES) for New Zealand by the end of 2001. The NCEES, released by the Minister of 
Energy on 27 September 2001, focused on two targets: a 20 per cent improvement in 
energy efficiency and a significant increase108 of New Zealand’s renewable energy supply 
by 2012. The NCEES was replaced, according to the Energy Efficiency and Conservation 
Act 109 , in 2007 by the New Zealand Energy Efficiency and Conservation Strategy 
(NZEECS).110  
                                               
106 See supra n 99, section 2g. 
107 MED Energy Policy Framework (Wellington, October 2000). 
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renewable energy supply. EECA National Energy Efficiency and Conservation Strategy – Towards a 
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110 See chapter II G. 
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(b) Ratification of the Kyoto Protocol 
On 10 December 2002, Prime Minister Helen Clark signed the document that 
affected New Zealand's ratification of the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change. New Zealand officially recognised that 
climate change is a global issue, and that it addresses this problem. “Under the Protocol, 
New Zealand has the obligation to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions to 1990 levels on 
average over the 2008-2012 commitment period, or to take responsibility for any 
emissions over these levels.”111 Furthermore, it was “required to develop and maintain a 
registry to ensure the accurate accounting of emission units. The Climate Change 
Response Act, passed by parliament in 2002, established New Zealand's registry and 
associated procedures.”112 
 (c)  The Resource Management Amendment Act 2004  
To give effect to the government’s policies, including the continuing 
“improvement in energy efficiency and progressive transition to renewable sources of 
energy from the NCEES and New Zealand’s obligations as a signatory to the Kyoto 
Protocol”113, the Resource Management Act (RMA) 1991 was amended. In March 2004, 
the Resource Management (Energy and Climate Change) Amendment Act passed and 
gave greater weight “to the efficiency of the end use of energy114, the effects of climate 
change115 and the benefits to be derived from the use and development of renewable 
energy”116. This Amendment Act tried to meet “the need for national direction in this area, 
expressed by a number of councils and local government to provide them with a stronger 
mandate and legally relevant guidance to take climate change effects” and the benefits of 
renewable energy into consideration.117 
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2 Further progress 
On 27 October 2004, a comprehensive discussion document on the future of 
sustainable energy in New Zealand was released. 118  It followed the Government’s 
Sustainable Development Programme of Action from January 2003 which identified 
energy as one of the four areas for action. The document was produced by an officials’ 
group led by the Ministry of Economic Development. “It was designed as the focal point 
for six months of consultation, the outcome of which should be the starting point for 
formal sustainable energy policy development.”119 The document identified the energy 
challenges and opportunities facing New Zealand as well as the possible future directions 
for energy policy development. 120 In 2005 after several workshops and a sustainable 
energy cabinet paper, the government confirmed its objective to create a reliable, resilient, 
environmentally responsible, and efficient energy system with fair prices. In order to 
reach this target, the government announced to explore various energy scenarios to 
explore a National Energy Strategy.121  
But before even the draft of a national strategy could be released, the 
government updated its Statement on Electricity Governance. 122  “It followed record 
electricity demand on the grid, delays in decisions on Transpower’s proposed North 
Island grid upgrade” and a huge electricity blackout in the CBD and the southern suburbs 
of Auckland, which “revealed shortcomings in maintenance procedures and the need to 
diversify supply into Auckland.” 123 New objectives for the provision of transmission 
services were included. “The transmission grid should be adequate resilient against the 
effects of low probability but high impact events as well as provide adequate supply 
diversity to larger load centres.”124 Furthermore, the Statement on Electricity Governance 
ensured “that the grid would facilitate competition in generation and minimise 
transmission constraints and that transmission planning would support the government’s 
                                               
118  MED Sustainable Energy: Creating a Sustainable Energy System for New Zealand (Wellington, 
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goal of facilitating renewable energies”125 whose development, investment and efficient 
uptake got the first time an own section126 in the GPS on electricity governance. 
On the 11 December 2006 the Government’s Draft New Zealand Energy 
Strategy was released for consultation with the public. It followed its terms of reference 
set out in July 2006 which identified the “priorities to achieve the government’s energy 
objectives of reliability and resilience, environmental responsibility and fair efficient 
prices for energy for current and future generations”.127 “The draft’s strategy objective 
was to ensure that New Zealand would develop a sustainable and affordable energy 
system which should minimise greenhouse gas emissions and give New Zealand an 
enduring competitive advantage over other countries”. 128  The Ministry of Economic 
Development received 331 submissions on the strategy from the energy industry, major 
energy users, community and non-governmental organisations, local and central 
government and interested members of the public. Following receipt and consideration of 
these submissions, on 11 October 2007 the final New Zealand Energy Strategy (NZES) 
was released. 
F The New Zealand Energy Strategy (NZES) 
This strategy was meant to be an important part of a package of initiatives the 
NZ Government introduced “to advance sustainability and economic transformation, and 
to help New Zealand respond to the climate change”. 129 Specifically, it tried to cope with 
the challenges of providing enough energy to meet the needs of “a growing economy, 
maintaining security of supply and reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions”.130 
The Minister of Energy131 Hon David Parker stated in the foreword that: 132  
 
The strategy along with the New Zealand Energy Efficiency and Conservation Strategy 
(NZEECS) will take sustainability to new levels, by championing renewable energy, 
                                               
125 See supra n 22. 
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energy efficiency at home and at work as well as the development and deployment of 
sustainable energy technologies. 
 
The primary target of the NZES, set and repeated steadily by the Government, is 
to accomplish “that 90 per cent of electricity will be generated from renewable sources by 
2025”.133 The NZES contains about 120 pages and is divided into two sections. While 
section one of the NZES sets out the government’s challenges and visions for a 
sustainable energy system and gives an overview of the possible actions, section two goes 
more into detail and introduces initiatives the government will take.134 
The NZES identified two major challenges: Energy security and climate change. 
In terms of energy security the government promised to watch the development in oil 
markets closely in order to react, if necessary. Furthermore, the NZES again highlighted 
the importance for NZ to maintain a secure electricity supply. Because of the dominance 
of hydro electricity in NZ, and the limited ability to store water, there would be still a 
good probability of shortages in dry years. When water is short, the NZ Government 
plans in the future to “maintain a secure electricity supply through an increased use of 
new renewable sources of electricity” instead of fossil fuel-based generation on which the 
have relied historically.135 
The NZES defined four main climate change challenges for NZ:136 
• The need to control and reduce their own GHG emissions.  
• The challenge to support international initiatives for multilateral action on GHG 
emissions.  
• The need to prepare for, and adapt to, the impacts of changes in their physical 
environment.  
• And finally, NZ should realise these objectives at the lowest achievable costs. 
With respect to reducing GHG emissions the government announced “its 
intention to introduce an Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) to give businesses flexibility 
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in deciding how to reduce their carbon footprint and to help set New Zealand on the path 
to a sustainable future”.137 
The NZES set out further actions in order to achieve “a reliable, resilient, 
sustainable and low emissions energy system”138 which could be divided into seven topics 
which are presented in the following: 
 
1 Providing clear direction on the future of the NZ energy system through strategic 
leadership 
To improve investor confidence and reduce non-market uncertainties the 
government wanted clearly signal its strategic direction for the energy sector. This would 
contain, according to the NZES, a definite intention and priority for investment in 
“renewable generation, efficient transmission, energy efficiency and new technologies” 
and the already mentioned introduction of an ETS. 139 Furthermore, the government held 
the view that there should be no support for any new base load fossil fuel generation over 
the next ten years. Therefore, the government will consider “regulatory options under the 
Electricity Act 1992 to reinforce its objectives for limiting new fossil fuel generation”.140 
 
2 Utilising markets and focused regulation to securely deliver energy services at 
competitive prices 
Especially concerning the electricity market, the NZES pointed out the 
importance of “a competitive market operating with a stable regulatory environment and 
with a reasonable certainty about fuel supplies”.141 According to the NZES, “this would 
keep prices at a competitive level and encourage timely investment in generation and 
infrastructure. Strong grid and lines arrangements would be particularly important for 
security and diversity of supply.”142 This was also recognised in the submissions on the 
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draft NZES. Especially, four issues emerged: The need for a “major investment in the 
transmission grid in order to fulfil the NZES vision of a high renewable future”. Secondly, 
the concern that differences in lead-in time, “needed for transmission and renewable 
generation developments, may make it harder to coordinate generation and transmission 
planning”. Furthermore, a “high renewables mix would require a particular transmission 
grid formation”. And finally, “much of the existing transmission infrastructure was old 
and urgently needed upgrading” at this point.143 
Proposed actions in this area included developing a National Policy Statement 
on electricity transmission under the RMA 144 , “relaxing restrictions on the lines 
companies’ ability to invest in generation and introducing distributed generation 
regulations to facilitate connections”.145 
3 Reducing GHG emissions, including through an ETS 
The long term objective of NZ is to reduce GHG below 1990 levels. According 
to the NZES: 146  
 
This objective will need not only greater efficiency and more use of renewable energy but also 
widespread uptake of zero and low carbon technologies such as electric cars and Carbon Capture and 
Storage (CCS). A commitment to support global efforts to reduce GHG emissions and the introduction of 
ETS should give the private sector an incentive to invest in clean technology, which is likely to be cheaper 
from current technologies with further emissions prices. 
 
 Besides the obvious measures to reduce GHG emissions (e.g. use energy more 
efficiently, use and development of renewable energy sources), the NZES wants to see 
NZ in “a position to deploy zero and low emissions technologies when they become 
economic and viable”.147 
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4 Using energy more efficiently 
The NZES recognised that NZ uses energy less efficiently than other countries, 
which would give scope for significant improvement. “Using energy more efficiently 
would reduce GHG and cut energy costs, including the need to provide more costly 
electricity generation capacity.” 148  In this connection, the NZEECS provided energy 
efficiency measures in more detail.149  
 
5 Promoting renewable energy 
The government again repeated its ambitious target of 90 per cent of electricity 
being generated from renewable sources by 2025. It highlighted that: 150  
 
NZ would be in a fortunate position to produce already large amounts of zero or low emissions 
electricity from renewable sources such as geothermal, wind and hydro, and that these sources are plentiful 
and cheap by world standards. For the future, wave and tidal electricity generation would be expected to 
become economically viable. 
 
 The government considered that their goal, 90 per cent by 2025, would be 
“achievable without imposing significant additional costs on the electricity sector”.151 
However, the government acknowledged the possible disadvantage of “renewable 
electricity generation having a larger visible effect on the local environment than fossil 
fuel electricity generation plants (e.g. wind farms have more impact on the environment 
than gas-fired thermal plants of equivalent output)”.152 In this connection it stated, that the 
balance between “climate change benefits of increasing renewable electricity and the 
potential impact on the local environment” has to be found.153 
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6 Promoting early adoption of environmentally sustainable energy technologies 
According to the NZES, energy generation, CCS and transport technology 
would all develop rapidly and would be expected to “play an important part in moving 
NZ towards a sustainable low emissions energy system”.154 NZ should ensure its ability 
to “start using these new technologies as soon as they become proven and economically 
viable”. 155  In the electricity sector, the government especially expects CCS to be 
economic by 2025, and therefore to help to achieve their ambitious goal. The government 
plans to “continue to build New Zealand research expertise and to encourage 
collaboration between existing research organisations”.156 Therefore, they are “supporting 
initiatives to build capacity and link participants from the research community, industry 
and central and local government”.157 
Further “key actions to facilitate environmentally sustainable energy 
technologies” included the “establishment of contestable funds to support the deployment 
of marine based electricity generation” as well as the improvement of “international 
linkages to enable NZ to be a fast adopter and adapter of new technologies”.158 
 
7 Supporting consumers through transition to a low emissions energy system 
In the NZES it was held that: 159 
 
The investment required to meet NZ’s future energy needs and reduce carbon emissions is likely 
to push energy prices. The government recognised that this cost impact would be hardest on low income 
households and on firms competing with businesses in countries that have not put a price on emissions. 
Therefore, the government considered options to assist the most affected business and residential 
consumers while the transition takes place. 
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G The New Zealand Energy and Efficiency Strategy (NZEECS) 
“The NZEECS has been written in accordance with section 10 (2) of the Energy 
Efficiency Act 2000. It replaced the National Energy Efficiency and Conservation 
Strategy 2001”.160 Since the Strategy 2001 was written, oil prices tripled and climate 
change accelerated. Contemplating these two defining issues, the EECA -with the aid of 
the government, the MED and the Electricity Commission- thought it was about time to 
reconsider it and make the new strategy to “a key point of the government’s response to 
meeting its energy, climate change, sustainability and economic transformation goals”.161 
The NZEECS came as a companion document to the NZES and was “a detailed action 
plan for increasing the uptake of energy efficiency, conservation and renewable energy 
programmes”.162 It demonstrated the government’s commitment to “addressing climate 
change concerns and progressing broader sustainability objectives”.163 
The NZEECS recognised lack of information, weak price signals and lacking 
access to capital as “barriers preventing individuals and businesses from taking up energy 
efficiency and renewable energy in the wider economy”.164 Consumers would be “often 
unaware of the benefits of renewable energy and how to realise them”.165 Furthermore, 
they would “struggle to meet the initial costs of these measures, even though they might 
be cost effective over time”.166 Education and awareness raising programmes as well as 
“incentive programmes, such as discounted products”, special grants and loans or a an 
assistance programme to support landlords insulating their property and setting minimum 
standards could help in this regard.167 The proposed actions should “be funded from a 
range of sources including the Government, the voluntary sector and individuals. The 
government already agreed to $ 184 Million in funding for a number of programmes"168  
which are divided in five big chapters: 
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1 Energywise homes 
The first chapter’s objective was to have a warm, dry healthy home with an 
improved air quality and reduced energy costs 169  for every single household in NZ. 
Especially, “inadequate insulation and poor quality heating would make many homes 
cold, damp and expensive to heat” 170  (more than a third of the total energy use in 
households was used for space heating in 2006). But many families would face the before 
mentioned “barriers to investing in energy efficiency and renewable energy”171. Therefore, 
the “government announced an Energywise Homes Package in its Budget 2007, casting 
$ 66 million to be delivered over four years and comprising” 172 five actions: 
• Firstly, improving the performance of existing homes including 
energywise interest free loans and home grants for insulation, energy 
efficiency or clean heat upgrades.173 
• Secondly, introducing better products with will be supported by 
measures like MEPS174 and MEPL175. These measures should improve 
the energy efficiency of domestic appliances as well as commercial and 
industrial equipment.176 
• Thirdly, amendments to address thermal performances and hot water 
systems of new homes are expected by the end of 2008.177 
• Furthermore, the Home Energy Rate Scheme will develop a star energy 
rating for the energy performance of a home that advises potential 
purchasers of its energy performance and how it could be improved.178 
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• Finally, the government is running a comprehensive programme to lift 
standards and encourage the uptake of solar hot water systems. The 
objective is to install 15,000 to 20,000 by the end of 2010. 179 
 
2 Energywise businesses 
The next chapter’s goal was to have “more energy efficient and competitive 
businesses using more renewable energy and emitting less carbon dioxide”. 180  The 
industrial and commercial sectors were responsible for 37 per cent of New Zealand’s 
annual GHG emissions in 2006. Consequently, the interest increased on the part of the 
businesses for the uptake of energy efficiency measures and renewable energy. 
The NZEECS encouraged this interest with the expansion of the Energy 
Intensive Businesses and Emprove Programmes and the implementation of an energy 
efficiency programme for workers.181 Furthermore, renewable energy programmes are 
ready to be launched. Especially, woody biomass and geothermal projects will be 
supported by capital grants182 which leads in the, for this work, most important chapter. 
 
3 New Zealand’s efficient and renewable electricity system  
As the NZES already set, the objective is to have 90 per cent of NZ’s electricity 
generated from renewable resources by 2025. This chapter resumed this very important 
goal and presented some new ideas to promote an efficient electricity system. The section 
about promoting the uptake of renewable electricity introduced hardly new aspects. 
(a) Promoting an efficient electricity system 
 The NZEECS presented a number of ways how an efficient electricity system 
could be promoted. It highlighted the need to improve consumer participation and the 
need “to optimise the operation and management of transmission and distribution systems 
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to minimise losses as well as the potential to reduce peak demand, when prioritising 
electricity efficiency investments and programmes”. 183 Reducing peak demand would 
lead to the reduction of “emissions from fossil fuel generators that are currently required 
in NZ to provide power at peak times”.184 Besides the help to reduce the peak demand, 
according to the NZEECS: 185 
 
 An efficient electricity system could also improve the ability of consumers to respond to 
wholesale prices. It could help temper market volatility and reduce potential abuse of market power when 
supply is tight. It may also raise consumer’s awareness of their energy consumption and provide incentives 
for behaviour change around the uptake of electricity efficiency, conservation and renewable energy.  
 
In terms of consumer participation, the NZEECS particularly concentrated on 
the small and medium-sized electricity consumer because there would be the most scope 
to improve. Especially, small users would have generally contracts “with electricity 
retailers offering the same flat rate for every unit of electricity consumed, regardless of 
whether wholesale prices would be high or if there would be network constraints”. 186 
Therefore, these users would not respond to pricing signals. “Smart meters, coupled with 
appropriate tariffs could enable greater consumer participation in the market”. 187 For 
example, these smart meters could be linked to regularly used domestic consumer goods 
(e.g. washing machine or air conditioner). And as soon as “a cheaper power rate is on 
offer”, the washing machine could start or the air conditioner could run on a higher level. 
Also, demand-size aggregation is seen as “another key to unlock consumer participation 
from small- to medium-sized electricity consumers”. 188  
Furthermore, the NZEECS proposed “an investigation into whether regulatory 
obligations on energy suppliers will deliver net benefits over current delivery 
mechanisms”.189 Finally, the management of distribution and transmission losses (account 
for around 7.5 per cent of electricity generation per year) has to be handled. A work 
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programme to solve the flaws in design, operation and physical characteristics of 
distribution will be developed.190  
(b) Promoting the uptake of renewable electricity 
In terms of promoting the uptake of renewable electricity, the NZEECS pointed 
out that it would be “easier for New Zealand than for almost any other country to commit 
to a low emissions electricity system”.191 Although 90 per cent of renewable electricity by 
2025 would be a challenging target, the NZEECS considered it achievable “given New 
Zealand’s wealth of renewable energy resources”. 192  But “meeting the target would 
require generating from a diverse range of renewable sources such as wind, geothermal, 
hydro and biomass”. 193  Other contributions to achieve this target could be seen in 
“emerging renewable technologies (such as wave, tidal and solar photovoltaic)” 194  as 
well as in more distributed generation, including small-scale generation. In this 
connection, a number of issues have been identified which are, according to the NZEECS, 
important for the uptake of renewable electricity: 195  
• The need for an emission trading scheme (ETS) including the cost of 
GHG emissions in order to stop the disadvantages for renewable 
compared to fossil fuel generation.  
• Regulatory barriers in the EIRA, RMA and the Building Code could 
discourage developers from investing in renewable generation or make 
obtaining consents for renewable energy developments more difficult.  
• According to the NZEECS, another problem is that the market for small-
scale generation is small and has not yet been able to take advantage of 
economies of scale to reduce costs. Therefore, the capability and capacity 
of suppliers and installers to meet increases in demand will need to be 
improved.  
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• Finally, the NZEECS criticised the lack of precommercial funding for 
emerging renewable technologies and the lack of information with 
respect to the industry, local government and consumers, which have to 
be better informed on the benefits and costs of renewable generation. 
To grapple these issues, the NZEECS presented a variety of actions and 
programmes including the National Policy Statement on renewable energy under the 
RMA196 and the “EECA’s regional renewable energy assessment programme” 197 in order 
to provide local governments with renewable energy information.  
Furthermore, many measures were planned in terms of distributed and small-
scale generation such as raise-awareness programmes on the benefits and costs of 
distributed generation, “a report on strategic implications of distributed generation, a 
work programme to develop technical guidelines or standards for small-scale 
distribution” 198  and a reporting programme monitoring the uptake of distributed 
generation. 
Also, the NZEECS actions concentrated on marine energy with a four-year fund 
of NZ $ 8 million “ bring forward the deployment of wave and tidal energy”199, a planned 
marine energy atlas as well as “a programme that will consider technical and industry 
standards for supporting the roll-out of marine energy systems” 200 . Concluding, this 
chapter the NZEECS pointed out the importance of continuing the support of associations 
like SEANZ, NZWEA, AWATEA and NZGA201 in order to promote renewable energy.202 
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4 Government leading the way as a role model 
Besides the chapter” energywise transport” which falls not within the scope of 
this paper, the final chapter referred to:203  
 
The government having a responsibility to improve its own performance with regard to 
electricity efficiency, conservation and the uptake of renewable energy. Doing so, would form a key part of 
the government’s programme for the core public service to help it become carbon neutral by 2012. 
 
H After NZES and NZEECS: Reforms in 2008 
Subsequent to the release of these both strategies, the government took 
important steps in 2008 in order to promote the uptake of renewable electricity. Besides 
the National Policy Statement (NPS) on Electricity Transmission, the GPS on Electricity 
Governance was updated and two important bills passed the parliament. 
1 National Policy Statement on Electricity Transmission 
On 13 March 2008, the National Policy Statement (NPS) on Electricity 
Transmission was issued. Since January 2005 the government had been looking at 
options for national guidance referring transmission issues by establishing a reference 
group. In 2007, the NPS was proposed and an independent Board of Inquiry was 
appointed to hear public views and prepare recommendations to the Minster for the 
Environment which loosely followed these recommendations when finalising the NPS.204 
The NPS was developed from the central government to “recognise the national 
significance of the national grid and to ensure that there is a balanced consideration of the 
national benefits and the local effects of electricity transmission”.205 Previously, there was 
no national framework that local governments could use when they had to decide on 
proposals for transmission lines. Now, this NPS “sets out the objective and policies to 
enable the management of the effects of the electricity transmission network under the 
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RMA”.206 It emphasises that “the efficient transmission of electricity plays a vital role in 
the well-being of New Zealand, its people and the environment”.207 It gives guidelines for 
the “decision-makers”208 under the RMA when:209  
 
Drafting plan rules, making decisions on the notification of the resource contents and 
considering notices of requirement for designations for transmission activities. However, the NPS is not 
meant to be a substitute for the RMA’s statutory purpose210. It is intended to be a relevant consideration to 
be weighed along with other considerations in achieving the sustainable management purpose of the RMA. 
 
According to the NPS, it is now a matter of national significance to “facilitate 
the operation, maintenance and upgrade of the existing transmission as well as any new 
transmission networks”.211 14 policies are expressed in order to recognise the national 
benefits of transmission while also managing any adverse environmental effects as well 
as “managing the adverse effects of other activities on the network”.212 
 
2 Updated Government Policy Statement on Electricity Governance 
On the 20 May 2008, the Minister of Energy signed an updated Government 
Policy Statement on Electricity Governance (GPS).213 The GPS was revised and updated 
to reflect all the changes since the GPS was originally released in October 2004 and 
amended in 2006.214  
Obviously, the biggest issue was the implementation of the NZES and NZEECS. 
They got their own chapter215, in which the responsibilities for delivering the NZES and 
NZEECS action are stipulated. “A Senior Energy Officials Group has been established to 
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oversee the implementation” 216 and to coordinate the development of the intended actions. 
“The group is led by the MED and includes the Electricity Commission as well as other 
relevant agencies such as the Ministry of Environment”.217 
Furthermore, the chapters on electricity efficiency and renewable energy were 
revised and updated in order to be consistent with the both strategies. The latter is now 
documenting the “target of generating 90 per cent of electricity from renewable sources 
by 2025” 218  as well as proposing an investigation, to be made by the Electricity 
Commission, of “ways in which wind generation could be best integrated into the current 
system in order to ensure that its maximum economic potential can be achieved”. 219 
Finally, important changes included: 220  
 
Requiring consideration of the need for grid upgrades to transfer renewable electricity from the 
point of generation to the points of consumption and updating reserve energy policy in line with the 
outcome of a comprehensive review carried out by the Electricity Commission. 
 
3 The Electricity Industry Reform Amendment Bill  
As seen above221, the EIRA 1998 “required ownership separation between lines 
and supply in order to facilitate competition in the electricity industry”. 222  The EIRA was 
amended twice223, mostly “to facilitate lines companies investing in generation of new 
renewables”.224 But the government noticed that despite these amendments “there was 
little investment in generation by lines businesses”. 225  After consultations with line 
companies it was agreed that “the amendments did not go far enough and that barriers 
remained to the lines businesses investing in generation”.226 Therefore, the purpose of this 
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bill was to “address the issues that discourage line companies from investing in 
renewable generation while retaining key restrictions on cross-involvement”.227 Three 
main policies should be implemented to achieve that: 228 
 
The first was to make it easier for owners of line businesses to sell the output of the generation 
they were permitted to own under the 2001 and 2004 amendments to the EIRA 1998. The objective was to 
encourage the owners of lines businesses to invest in permitted generation, especially from renewable 
sources. This policy objective was to be achieved by allowing retail sales of electricity of up to 100 per cent 
of the nominal annual output capacity of permitted generation. 
 
 Furthermore, they planned to “allow trading in financial hedges to manage spot 
market risks and to lower the cost of corporate separation and compliance with arm 
length rules by raising the threshold for requiring compliance”229 as well as “allowing the 
same person to be the director of both lines and supply (generation and retailing) 
businesses” 230 under certain circumstances. These amendments are particularly to find 
under the new section 17 of the EIRA.231 
 
The second main change was to narrow the scope of ownership separation requirements to focus 
on the geographic areas where there is potential for the exercise of market power, namely, where lines and 
supply businesses are co-located. This was achieved by allowing owners of lines businesses to be involved 
in generation and retailing without any limit outside of their lines area. On the other hand, existing 
ownership separation rules were retained in the case co-location between lines and supply. Because co-
owned and co-located lines and supply businesses have both the incentive and ability to lessen competition 
in retailing and local generation. Where co-located cross-ownership of lines and supply is permitted in 
order to encourage investment in permitted generation, corporate separation and the requirement to act on 
arms-length basis is retained in order to reduce the risks of anti-competitive behaviour.232 
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“The third main change was to amend the definition of renewables. The 2001 
amendments to the EIRA 1998 sought to create incentives for lines companies to build 
new renewables generation”. 233  The definition of “new renewable energy sources” 
excluded consequently hydro and geothermal energy sources. The new amendments 
proposed changing the definition to all forms of renewable generation in order to allow 
owner of lines businesses now to invest in all renewables without quantity limitation. 
 
4 The Climate Change (Emissions Trading and Renewable Preference) Bill 
The purpose of this bill was “to establish New Zealand Emissions Trading 
Scheme and to legislate for the government’s preference for new renewable electricity 
generation”. 234 It had two parts which were split in 2008 into two bills: the Climate 
Change Response (Emissions Trading) Amendment Bill and the Electricity (Renewable 
Preference) Amendment Bill. Both bills passed in parliament on 10 September 2008. 
The first bill “amended the Climate Change Response Act 2002 (CCRA) to 
introduce a greenhouse gas emissions trading scheme in all sectors”. 235  Most of the 
changes were to part 2 of the CCRA which extended the scope of the New Zealand 
Emission Units Register (NZEUR) allowing “New Zealand Units (NZUs) to be created, 
held and transferred between account holders and the linking of the ETS to the 
international Kyoto market as well as to other countries’ domestic trading schemes”.236 
Furthermore, new parts 4 and 5 were inserted into the CCRA to implement the core 
provisions of the ETS including a determination of persons and their obligations covered 
by the ETS237 and dates when they will be covered238. 
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The Electricity (Renewable Preference) Amendment Bill “gave legislative 
backing to the policy outlined in the NZES”239, adopting a target for renewable generation 
of 90 per cent of New Zealand’s electricity generation by 2025. Consequently, “the 
NZES stated a clear preference that all new electricity generation be renewable, except to 
the extent necessary to maintain to supply and signalled consideration of regulatory 
options under the Electricity Act 1992” 240 in order to support the ambitious objective. 
This sill inserted a new part 6A into the Electricity Act 1992 to create the 
targeted preference. It should be “achieved through a 10 year restriction on new fossil 
fuelled thermal generation, except to the extent required to ensure the security of New 
Zealand’s electricity supply”.241 The provisions apply to any proposed thermal generation 
above 10 megawatts that uses more than 20 per cent fossil fuels as its fuel source. 
However, it allows for exemptions which can enable peaking and firming roles for fossil 
fuelled thermal generation to provide security of supply and to support a high renewables 
future, based on intermittent wind and hydro generation. 242  A new section 62G is 
proposed which prescribes in every single detail the processes and parameters for 
exemption.243  
The latest reform step on the way to the target of 90 per cent of electricity 
generated from renewable sources by 2025 is the National Policy Statement for 
Renewable Electricity Generation. In the following, this paper will take a look on the 
concerns of the government and its possible solutions. 
I National Policy Statement for Renewable Electricity Generation 
In August 2008, the Ministry for Environment published the proposal for a 
National Policy Statement for Renewable Electricity Generation which is targeted to 
enable the sustainable management of renewable electricity generation under the RMA 
1991. The intention to propose this NPS was announced with the release of the NZES in 
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October 2007. It is a key action of the NZES in support of the government’s sustainable 
energy goals and also complements the NZEECS.244 The explicit objective of the NPS 
is:245 
To recognise the national significance of renewable electricity generation by promoting the 
development, upgrading, maintenance and operation of new and existing renewable generation activities, 
such that 90 per cent of NZ’ electricity will be generated from renewable sources by 2025. 
 
It introduces 5 policies in order to “provide guidance to decision-makers when 
considering applications for resource consent to undertake renewable electricity 
generation”246 on one hand. On the other hand, the last 2 policies are targeted to “remove 
unnecessary regulatory barriers to enable the identification of renewable electricity 
generation possibilities and the development of small and community-scale renewable 
electricity generation”.247 
In the following, this paper illustrates the background of the policies’ two main 
concerns:  
1 Providing guidance 
Between 1991 and 2006, “only 17 per cent of generation capacity consented 
under the RMA was renewable”. 248  One of the main reasons was the “concern that 
renewable electricity projects faced particular hurdles under the RMA that reduced the 
attractiveness of these (already costly to develop) projects when compared with the 
alternative of fossil fuel-based thermal generation” 249 which at the same time had grown 
substantially. During this period more than the half of all wind projects was “subject to 
appeal to the Environment Court”.250 The jurisdiction, council officers and the decision-
makers were not sure at this time if and how to weigh the benefits of renewable 
electricity generation. But with the amendments of the RMA in 2004 and, even more 
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importantly, with “the release of the NZES and the Climate Change (Emissions Trading 
and Renewable Preference) Act 2008, the focus of the NZ electricity market has shifted 
towards the use and development of renewable energy sources”.251 
However, “renewable electricity generation activities are often accompanied by 
significant actual or potential adverse environmental effects” 252  (e.g. on “areas of 
significant natural character, historic heritage, outstanding natural features and 
landscapes”253). So “matters of national importance as set out in section 6 of RMA can 
compete with matters to which decision-makers are required to have particular regard 
under section 7(i) and (j) of the RMA”.254 These “balancing judgements made subject to 
part II of the RMA can be particularly complicated and take time”255 because though the 
decision-makers now know that they have to “consider the benefits of renewable 
electricity generation it still does not clarify the nature of these benefits or provide 
guidance on the weight that should be afforded to them”. 256 “Decisions made by the 
Environment Court257 are beginning to establish case law that tackles and clarifies [the] 
issue. Nevertheless, the lack of statutory guidance complicates the decision-making 
process and has contributed to persistent uncertainty in the marketplace”.258 Therefore, 
this NPS tries to adopt “a nationally consistent approach to balancing the competing 
values associated with the development of New Zealand’s renewable energy resources. 
This will provide greater certainty to decision-makers, applicants and the wider 
community”.259 
2 Removing unnecessary regulatory barriers:260 
Many current and likely future means of generating electricity from renewable sources are in the 
early phases of commercialisation and their effects and viability are often unknown. As such, more research 
and investigation into potential generation technologies and energy sources will be necessary to ensure that 
                                               
251 Ibid, 4. 
252 Ibid, 3. 
253 Examples taken from section of the RMA 1991. 
254See supra n 3, preamble.  
255 See supra n 248, 19 
256 Ibid. 
257 Genesis Power Limited v Franklin District Council A 148/05; Unison Networks and Hawke’s Bay Wind 
Farm v Hastings District Council W 58/06 
258 See supra n 248, 19. 
259 See supra n 3, preamble. 
260 See supra n 248, 20. 
48 
 
the decisions of New Zealand’s energy sector promote the sustainable management of natural and physical 
resources. 
 
“Removing unnecessary regulatory barriers to innovation in New Zealand’s 
energy sector will support adaptation to market change; it will also enable generators to 
embrace new opportunities in the short to medium term”.261 Therefore, “policy statements 
and plans will need to be amended to remove impediments to research and 
investigation”.262 Many regional and district plans have to be also amended in another 
regard, their position on small-scale renewable projects. The NZ government recognised 
a “significant potential for smaller community-scale distributed renewable electricity 
generation [and that it could] make a valuable cumulative contribution towards 
developing a reliable, secure and clean electricity supply in NZ”.263 But many plans are 
silent on these projects. Consequently, the consent procedure under the RMA remains the 
same for small–scale projects as for big projects what leads to proportionately higher 
costs.264  Therefore, this NPS tries to remove regulatory barriers in order to encourage the 
investment in new technologies and small-scale projects. 
The next chapter will examine how the NPS deals in detail with the above 
mentioned issues by presenting every policy in particular: 
3 The NPS’ Policies 
(a) Recognising the national significance of the benefits of renewable electricity 
generation activities 
“This policy was drafted to explicitly ascribe national significance to the 
benefits of renewable electricity generation, not dependent on the scale of the project or 
the level of the benefit (national, regional or local)”.265 “It focuses attention on the three 
key benefits of renewable electricity generation” 266 , namely the increase of New 
Zealand’s electricity generation capacity, the decrease of GHG emissions and the 
                                               
261 See supra n 248, 44. 
262 Ibid, 20. 
263 Ibid. 
264 Ibid. 
265 Ibid, 34. 
266 Ibid. 
49 
 
increase of security of supply.267 This policy is meant to be “a clear signal as to how the 
government views the benefits of renewable electricity generation and should clarify”268 it 
for the decision-makers and also the generators who would have not anymore to justify 
the benefits of this generation. Consequently, it would reduce their costs and also 
increase market certainty.269 
(b) Acknowledging the practical constraints associated with the development, 
upgrading, maintenance and operation of new and existing renewable 
electricity generation activities:270 
 
This policy has been proposed to recognise practical constraints set by location of the renewable 
energy resource or by the technical/engineering aspects of the generation technology. In some instances, it 
will limit the ability of the developers to avoid or mitigate adverse environmental effects of renewable 
electricity generation activities.  
In summary, “policy 2 seeks to tip the balance in favour of renewable electricity 
projects that, for reasons deriving from practical constraints, might otherwise fail to gain 
commercially viable resource consent”. 271  The advantage of this policy is that it “is 
directed towards decision-makers and its effects will be felt immediately without having 
to wait”272 for a regional plan to implement it. Furthermore it was stated that: 273  
 
Setting out the list of factors that may constrain project design, site selection, and therefore 
measures to avoid or mitigate adverse effects, will help both to define the information that should be 
supplied to decision-makers and the matters that decision-makers are required to consider. Therefore, the 
main benefit of this policy is likely to derive from the increased guidance it provides to consent authorities 
surrounding the consideration of adverse effects. 
 
A possible disadvantage of policies 1 and 2 is that both combined could tip the 
“balance in favour of renewable electricity” programmes at a too high “cost of the natural 
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and physical environment”.274 But on the other hand, there is still the main purpose of part 
II of the RMA (sustainable management of natural and physical resources) to consider 
which prevents that the development of renewable generation projects will come at any 
cost.275 
 
(c) Having regard to the relative reversibility of adverse effects associated with 
particular generation types 
This policy wants “to ensure that the relative degree of different generation 
technologies is recognised by developers when designing projects and considered by 
decision makers in the consent procedure”.276 According to this policy, “it is appropriate 
to consider the longevity of effects associated with generation technologies and to 
provide an avenue of policy support for those that can be removed with relatively little 
long-term impact”.277 For instance, some technologies have the potential to be transitional 
like marine and wind turbine generators which can be removed at the end of projects, 
while others like hydro-generation have functionally irreversibly effects. As reasonable 
this policy seems at the first sight, its implementation would bring some questions and 
problems. Some could argue that the policy proves prejudicial against technologies like 
hydro-generation and therefore risk the overall objective of 90 per cent by 2025 because 
hydro is the main renewable source in New Zealand.278 Another problem seems to be that 
“section 3 of the RMA already contemplates temporary effects”. 279  In this regard, 
decision-makers have the chance “to consider the temporary nature, or reversibility, of 
effects associated with a particular proposal. This policy therefore risks replicating an 
existing requirement of the RMA”.280 Furthermore, “the concept of reversibility is open to 
interpretation”. 281  While it is quite easy to remove the turbines of a shut off wind farm, it 
is very unlikely that the foundations or the access roads will be removed. “This lack of 
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clarity could be used in arguments against particular development proposals and has the 
potential to increase litigation costs”. 282 
 
(d) Enabling identification of renewable electricity generation possibilities 
This policy tries to help ensure a secure supply in NZ. It “encourages research 
and investigation into new sites and sources of generation”. 283 Therefore, “it will provide 
the market participants with easier access to the information they require to develop 
sufficient renewable generation capacity”.284 This policy will also enable smaller players 
to enter the market by carving themselves a niche using new technologies. “Building a 
regulatory environment that supports research and innovation will enable the NZ 
generator market to respond quickly to overseas innovation and experience, and to adapt 
the market movement”.285 
 
(e) Supporting small and community-scale renewable electricity generation 
This policy “addresses the disproportionately high consenting costs associated 
with small and community-scale renewable electricity generation projects”. 286 It “will 
remove barriers to investment in a scale of generation that has the potential to make a 
significant contribution to ensuring security of supply as well as to meeting the 
government’s 2025 renewable generation target”.287 A certain threshold of 288 
 
Installed capacity has been selected to capture the great majority of small-scale projects that are 
expected to be viable in rural and island locations across NZ, without providing a streamlined resource 
consenting process for those projects that may result in unacceptably significant adverse effects. 
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Possible disadvantages of this policy could be the “emergence of one to three 
wind turbine assemblages in various rural and island locations, thereby spreading the 
adverse effects over a wider area”. 289  Also, this policy “could be misinterpreted as 
indicating particular support for small scale over large scale development”.290 
 
III GERMANY 
A The Early History of the German Electricity Market 
1 The beginning of Germany’s electrification 
The electrification in Germany began around 1890. At first, the electricity 
market could not compete with the prices of the gas market. But local public transport 
grew in this time and needed electricity constantly. In this time, the profitability of 
electricity supply grew immensely because the municipalities built electric power stations 
in order to support their local public transport system with their own electricity. By 1910, 
almost every bigger city in Germany had their own electric power station.291 
With the establishment of a transmission system from the very end of the 19th 
century on, many municipalities operated rather as a distributor than as a generator. 
Already in 1898, the Rheinisch Westfälisches Elektrizitätswerk (RWE) was founded as the 
first supra regional electricity company and took over the generation in the whole 
northwest of Germany within a short period of time.292 
During the First World War, the government, more precisely the department for 
energy resources of the ministry of war, started to monitor the electricity market. In this 
connection, the government also took over the generator Elektrowerke AG (EWAG)293 
and entered the circle of electricity suppliers. By the middle of the 1920s, VIAG and 
RWE generated almost 50 per cent of Germany’s electricity while the other half was still 
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produced by industrial companies in their own power stations.294 But the Energy Industry 
Act 1935295 changed the whole situation in Germany. 
 
2 The Energy Industry Act 1935 
This act broke with the tradition of Germany’s energy law that the electricity 
market follows the principle of freedom of trade. Instead, the Energy Industry Act 1935 
introduced a state-directed economy in which construction and extension of plants, their 
corporate governance and the price setting of tariffs were subject to the government’s 
supervision. 296  The most important supervisory instrument was the government’s 
mandatory consent in order to practise in the area of energy supply. The consent was 
denied if the electricity supplier could not grant security of and economically priced 
supply which were both the main objectives of the Energy Industry Act 1935.297 
Until 1998, the Energy Industry Act itself was only slightly amended. However, 
the Competition Act 1958298 brought further changes in the electricity market. 
3   The Competition Act 1958 
In 1958, the Competition Act passed in the German parliament and added to the 
above mentioned governmental supervision another form of supervision. Namely, the 
Cartel Office supervised over potential violations caused by internal agreements between 
the big electricity companies. This supervision became necessary because of two unique 
features of the German electricity market: concession and demarcation contracts.299 
A concession contract is concluded between a municipality and the distribution 
network operator which exclusively entitles the operator to build, operate and maintain 
lines in order to provide electricity within a well defined area for a certain period of time. 
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In return the municipality receives a concession fee, capped by law, which is calculated 
on a special scheme based on the amount of energy consumed in the municipality.300  
Demarcation contracts are concluded between two suppliers in order to 
determine the supply areas in a mutual binding. Therefore, only one electricity supplier 
was responsible for one supply area and in this area no one else did retail except the one. 
These two sorts of contracts were heavily inhibiting fair competition and 
violated consequently the basic principle of the GWB. But the exceptions in section 103 
GWB were based on the thought that it is the very nature of the network infrastructure 
being a natural monopoly. 
 
B The First Wave of Liberalisation 
1 First steps 
It lasted until the late eighties till the opinion was generally accepted that 
electricity should be liberalised. In this time, the network access for new competitors was 
discussed within the European Community (EC). In this connection, Great Britain was 
the leading country by not only opening the network access for third parties but also 
starting to privatise and “unbundle” its electricity monopoly. The European Commission 
showed the first time with a working paper on the internal energy market from 2 May 
1988 that the monopolisation of the electricity market in the member states might not be 
compatible with the law of the European Union (EU).301  
Additionally in Germany, a committee for questions of deregulation, formed by 
the government, published a report in 1991, in which it called for the abolition of section 
103 GWB and its system of protected supply areas in order to facilitate the competition in 
the German electricity market. Furthermore, the government started to worry that the 
competitiveness of Germany as a business location would be in danger because of the 
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excessive prices caused by the monopolisation.302 But the liberalisation of the German 
electricity market did not happen before the government had to implement the European 
Directive in 1996. 
2 The European Directive 96/92/EC 
 Germany’s liberalisation process was initiated by the European Directive 
96/92/EC. There were two principles of the EU Treaty which should had been applicable 
to the electricity market even before. Firstly, the free movement of goods, persons, 
services and capital within the market and the rules relating to cartel and market abuse. In 
1990, there was a first try to step towards these two principles by defining price 
transparency charged to industrial end users. 303  “However, the Directive 96/92/EC 
introduced common rules with stronger measures on the European electricity market and 
set the framework and the policy for market liberalisation by breaking national 
monopolies”.304 
 Its overall goal was to open the access in the grid systems of the member states 
which should lead “to a directly comparable level of opening up markets and to a directly 
comparable degree of access to electricity markets in the states”.305 “Network access was 
considered to be the crucial issue and main barrier to competition”.306 According to the 
directive, network operators should be “obliged to allow generators and consumers to 
have access to their networks to trade in accordance with the objectives of transparency 
and non-discrimination”.307 Chapter VII of the directive left the member states the choice 
between three options for the organisation to open up their network: negotiated or 
regulated third party access (TPA) or single buyer procedure. 308  Furthermore, the 
directive aimed on the unbundling and transparency of accounts. Electricity supply 
companies were required to “keep separate accounts for their generation, transmission 
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and distribution activities in order to avoid discrimination, cross-subsidisation and 
distortion of competition”. 309  The directive was only the framework for the national 
legislator to create a competitive market at the national level. Every member state of the 
EU radically changed the structure of their electricity industry. But without standardised 
guidelines or a certain experience on details, which are recognised as essential for market 
and reform success, the result was a wide range of different reform approaches reflecting 
the different national interests.310 Germany did its reform approach in the form of the 
Energy Industry Act 1998. 
3 The Energy Industry Act 1998 
Germany implemented the Directive 96/92/EC with the Energy Industry Act on 
29 April 1998, of which following aspects stood out. First, Germany’s entire electricity 
was opened to all consumers by removing the exceptional provisions of the GWB, 
especially section 103. With respect to generation this was surprising, but 100 per cent 
end user eligibility from the start was exceptional in 1998 and went far beyond the 
required measures of the directive in article 19. “Full retail competition in Germany 
worked well technically, but competition only developed slowly for domestic and small 
end users”.311 
Second, the minimal requirements of unbundling were also implemented into 
national law but the rules were weak and not enforced. Finally, Germany took a very 
light handed approach with respect to the regulation of network access and opted for the 
negotiated TPA, being the exception within Europe, whereas in most countries of the EU 
regulated TPA was the standard: 312 
 
Negotiated TPA implied that – despite the monopolistic networks – the sector was left without 
sector specific regulation and regulator. The government trusted the industry to resolve the problems 
around network access and network charges by voluntary negotiations controlled by the Cartel Office. 
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Network access had to be arranged collectively in the so called association agreements 
(Verbändevereinbarungen). 
4 The association agreements  
In practice, the economic rules of access to electricity were private agreements, 
called association agreements (AA). They were collective contracts which linked 
“electricity utilities among themselves with the Association of the Industrial Energy”313 
and Power Industry (VIK – Verband der Industriellen Kraftwirtschaft) and with the 
Federation of German Industries (BDI – Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie).The 
first two agreements on criteria for the regulation of network access fees314 were only 
negotiated between the both aforementioned VIK and BDI as well as the German 
Electricity Association (VDEW – Vereinigung Deutscher Elekrizitätswerke). Private 
consumers and small businesses as well as new retail companies were left out.315 These 
agreements led to a self regulation of the different network operators by common 
understanding which was too unsatisfactorily controlled by the little countervailing power 
of the association of the consumers, BDI and VIK.316 
Therefore, the third and last AA on criteria for the regulation of network access 
fees for electric energy and principles on network access 317 was negotiated by more 
participants. “On one hand, the Federal Ministry of Economics created its task force on 
access to the grid in April 2001”318 which participated in the negotiations as well as 
smaller consumer associations now took part. But “on the other hand, the electricity 
industry had split into four parts with the appearance of three new players” 319 : the 
association of grid operators (DVG – Deutsche Verbundgesellschaft), the association of 
regional utilities (ARE- Arbeitsgemeinschaft Regionaler Energieversorgungsunternehmen) 
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and the association of municipal distribution utilities (Verbund Kommunaler 
Unternehmen). 
Results of this third AA were the enhancement of TPA in the area of the mass 
retail industry as well as more transparency of different access fees and of the different 
network structures.320 “But at no stage the precise level of network charges were agreed 
upon or laid down. These were the sole responsibility of the individual network 
owners”.321 The agreements were neither legally binding nor were the recommendations 
of the task force or the consumer associations legally binding. In this time, the only 
control was in the hands of the Cartel Office. 
5 The Cartel Office 
Though the network access regulation and the methods for calculating the fees 
were set in an almost totally private environment322, there was some control in terms of 
network access and charges exercised by the Cartel Office. “To facilitate its task the 
Competition Act was strengthened with an essential facilities doctrine in 1998, which 
required that access to the network should be provided on non discriminatory terms and a 
fair and reasonable charge”. 323 There was only one clause in the Competition Act, being 
the main regulatory instrument. 
“Control was not strong and network charges were (and in fact still are 
persistently high). The Cartel Office faced a number of problems”.324 Most importantly, 
its traditional regime of intervention was ex post, which means that most claims and 
cases were opened because of the abuse of dominant market power by incumbent utilities. 
These companies had the power and the stamina to protract proceedings in contrast to 
new market participants which did often not have the financial backing. Furthermore, 
“the cases were decided on case by case basis and not by precedent, and decisions made 
by the Cartel Office could be challenged in court”.325 
                                               
320 Jürgen Pilny „Verbändevereinbarungen“ in Ulrich Loewenheim, Alexander Riesenkampff and Karl 
Meeser (ed) Kartellrecht (Beck, München 2005) section 72. 
321 See supra n 304, 242. 
322 See chapter III 4. 
323 See supra n 311, 242. 
324 Ibid. 
325 See supra n 9, 49. 
59 
 
Another problem was that the Cartel Office was seriously understaffed for its 
intended task. Finally, the Competition Act was “well suited to address discriminatory 
behaviour but the more persistent problem turned to be the high level of network charges 
which was difficult to address with the Competition Act”.326   
6 Outcome of the first liberalisation wave 
“After the German market was liberalised in 1998, foreign companies showed 
special interest in entering the German electricity market”. 327  Although the German 
generation market was by far not as attractive as other European markets in terms of the 
wholesale price, “the need for additional capacity or expected demand growth, many 
companies considered it strategically important to be present in the largest electricity 
market in Europe”. 328But it took only a few years to let the excitement die down. Several 
reasons can be given for this development. The most important one was the hostility of 
the German electricity market towards new entrants. As seen above, the first association 
agreements were biased against third parties. In these times, there had been persistent 
complaints about discrimination of third parties. Furthermore, it was very difficult to get 
hold of new plant sites. Finally, as already indicated above, the wholesale prices were 
unattractively low.329 As a result, “many new plant projects were either given up or had to 
look for new investors who were willing to keep these projects alive and wait for better 
times. New firms entered the market mainly through acquisitions”. 330  The leading 
examples in this connection were the French EDF who bought a stake in the EnBW 
(Energie Baden-Württemberg) 331  and “the Swedish Vattenfall Group which bought 
Hamburg’s municipal utility and a 44.8 per cent share in Berlin’s utility BEWAG”.332 
Besides the generation market, there was also a lot of frustration with respect to 
the retail market. In the years between 1998 and 2002 several retailers were initially 
successful but went bankrupt by and by because of high marketing costs and decreasing 
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margins. The explanation of this phenomenon can be found in the institutional 
framework:333  
 
The vertical integration of competitive and monopolistic businesses usually provides an 
incentive to secure profits in the natural monopolies and set low margins at the competitive stages which 
will frustrate development of active competition and the entry of new market participants. 
 
 In other words, Germany’s big transmission system operators did not gain their 
profits in generation or retail but in the wire business through inadequately high prices in 
the time after the first liberalisation wave. Economists estimated that incumbent vertically 
integrated operators did close at least 40 per cent of the retail market in this manner.334 
 
C The Second Wave of Liberalisation 
1 Status quo: Market concentration and protection 
Despite the reform steps, described in chapter B, the structure of the German 
electricity market still remained strongly vertically integrated. An oligopoly dominated 
(and still dominates) Europe’s largest electricity market and four predominantly privately 
owned big utilities own and operate the transmission grids and most of the power 
plants.335 These firms are both transmission system operators and dominant generators. 
The amount of the utilities had been reduced from eight to four during the first wave of 
liberalisation. In 2000/2001, RWE and VEW merged into RWE, and VEBA and VIAG 
merged into E.ON. In the northeast of Germany the Swedish Vattenfall Energy Group 
took over VEAG, HEW and BEWAG and united their formerly three different supply 
areas into a big one. After these mergers and acquisitions the four big utilities (RWE, 
E.ON, Vattenfall and the already earlier mentioned EnBW) owned more than 80 per cent 
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of the generation capacity and the transmission network.336 Moreover, they also have 
majority shares in many distribution networks and retail activities. The Cartel Office 
noticed in their monitoring report from 2002 that RWE and E.ON alone had shares in 
about 25 per cent of the 800 different municipality owned firms, which are responsible 
for distribution and retail in their area.337  
These mergers and acquisitions increased the market concentration in generation 
as well as in retail since the beginning of the liberalisation in 1998. The oligopoly tried 
by all means to protect their strong position in the German electricity market. Hence, the 
government, more precisely the Ministry of Economics, felt the need to call for stronger 
regulation in 2003.  
2 Monitoring report 2003 of the Ministry of Economics 
In August 2003, the Ministry of Economics published the so called monitoring 
report on the industrial and competitive effects of the association agreements in the 
electricity sector. 338  This report considered the question whether improvement with 
respect to the network access and the regulation of competition could be made. 
According to this report, the association agreements and the control of the Cartel Office 
helped to quickly develop a reasonable system for the network access. The liberalisation 
would have lead first to a significant decrease of the electricity prices, but after a couple 
of years the prices increased again.339 This was of course not only related to higher retail 
prices but also a result of taxes deriving from the German environment policy.340 
Unfortunately, the impetus of new and more competition, caused by the 
liberalisation of the electricity market, did not result in sufficient price decrease. 
According to the report, this could be explained by the concentration in the generation 
market as well as in the increasing vertical integration of the big electricity utilities.341 
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Another point of criticism was the absence of a broadly accepted procedure to 
calculate adequate network fees. In this connection, the association agreements would 
have not been satisfactory. The report especially criticised that the AA would not 
adequately address the issue of energy efficiency (e.g. how the big utilities could ensure 
energy efficiency all over the country beyond their own supply areas).342 
Concerning the problems of the Cartel Office, the Ministry of Economics agreed 
with the opinion that the Office’s competence in respect of controlling the network access 
and its fees would not be sufficient. Responsible for that would be – besides the already 
mentioned reasons343 – the complexity of the cases. 
Besides the problems with the network access fees, the report recognised other 
factors as impediments to the market entrance of new participants. According to the 
report, impediments to the market entrance would be still not standardised contracts and 
procedures when switching the distribution sector which would cause a lot of transaction 
costs. Furthermore, the stronger unbundling of the network could contribute to exclude 
cross subsidisation.344 
The report concluded that the last association agreement created a basis for 
competition on the electricity sector which is able to operate. But important regulation 
should be improved or stated more precisely. Especially, the calculation of the network 
access fees would need adequate mechanisms which could lead to competitive prices as 
well as to secure electricity supply. Parallel to this report, the German government gave 
up its resistance in Brussels and the EC seized the opportunity to remove negotiated TPA 
from its directive.345 
3 The European Directive 2003/54/EC 
The Commission of the European Union “was not satisfied with the outcome of 
a free and unregulated market and announced another directive 346 to advance market 
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liberalisation” 347. “The new Directive 2003/54/EC included some key elements of an 
energy liberalisation package and represented a major step towards fully competitive and 
liberalised markets”.348  
The most important regulation of this directive was the obligation to open the 
retail market for all non household electricity consumers by July 2004 and for all others 
by July 2007 (article 21 (1)), the establishment of a national economic independent 
regulator (article 23), and a legal separation of lines businesses from the competitive parts 
(articles 10 and 15). 
As seen above, the first obligation was already carried out in Germany with the 
enforcement of the Energy Industry Act 1998. But establishing an “economic 
independent regulator from July 2004 with specified duties related to network fees and 
transparency of financial unbundling as well as monitoring the electricity market with 
respect to fair competition”349, excluded the industrial self regulation which was practised 
in the German electricity supply industry until this point. Therefore, the model of 
negotiated third party access, chosen by Germany, had to give way to the in Europe 
commonly used model of regulated third party access. 
In this context, it is mentionable that Germany was successful in influencing and 
weakening the directive to the effect that the regulator was “only required to agree to the 
methodology underlying the calculation of network fees, and subsequently the level of 
the charges could remain subject of ex post control”.350 
To the provisions, concerned with the unbundling of network system operators, 
it is notable that the directive had an exception clause. According to article 15 (2), 
member states may decide not to apply the unbundling of integrated electricity 
undertakings, if they serve less than 100,000 connected customers. For the German 
market this meant that almost 85 per cent of all utilities were exempt from unbundling.351 
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This directive and the monitoring report, discussed in the last chapter, were the 
key developments which lead to the new German Energy Industry Act which entered into 
force on 13 July 2005. 
4 The Energy Industry Act 2005 
 As explained in the last chapters, the Energy Industry Act 1998 was replaced by 
the Energy Industry Act 2005 for a variety of reasons. It is by far more complex than the 
old act, caused by the numerous provisions of the Directive 2003/54/EC which had to be 
implemented.352 General purpose of the act is a secure, non-discriminatory, reasonably 
priced, customer-friendly, efficient and sustainable supply of electricity. The key 
elements in the new act are the following. First, the rules on unbundling were 
strengthened but they still only minimally fulfil the directive’s requirements. Second, the 
rather artificial hybrid approach of ex ante approval of the methodology and ex post 
control was not carried through, and a clear step has been taken forward ex ante 
regulation of the network charges. Third, there was created a sector specific regulator: the 
Federal Network Agency (BNA – Bundesnetzagentur).353 
(a) Unbundling 
 The unbundling requirements correspond to the Directive 2003/54/EC. Hence, the 
Energy Industry Act requires legal (section 7 of the Energy Act 2005) as well as 
functional and management (section 8) separation of transmission system operator and 
distribution system operator with the exemption made in article 15 (2) of the directive354, 
confidentiality of information (section 9) and accounting separation. But the problem was 
not the implementation of these provisions. The more urgent point seemed to be the 
enforcement and the control of the unbundling regulations. Concerns were raised whether 
ownership unbundling would have any prospect. In this context, the legal problem would 
be that the “four transmission system operators are largely in private hands, and that 
ownership unbundling is expropriation and violates the constitution”.355 
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 However, the obligation for the vertically integrated utilities to start unbundling 
had to be applied not until July 2007, so that this dissertation will come back to this topic 
later. 
(b) Ex ante regulation of the network charges 
Article 23 (2) of the Directive 2003/54/EC “requires fixing or approving, prior 
their entry at least the methodologies to calculate the network charges. The precise 
phrasing reflected Germany’s wish to stick to ex post control of the level of the 
charges”.356 After a long discussion, “it had been decided in Germany that the by-pass in 
the directive should be ignored and the ex ante regulation of the level of the access 
charges should be applied”.357 
But the main debate had been on the type of regulation. The formal current state 
at that time was that regulation was cost based (see section 21 of the Energy Industry Act 
2005), which reflected business as usual. “Previously, the self regulation followed the 
accounting principles laid down in the association agreement” 358 : With the Energy 
Industry Act 2005, “the legislator explicitly allowed the option to switch to incentive-
based regulation (section 21a), which can be a price-cap or revenue-cap regulation. The 
regulator had been given to develop an incentive-regulation mechanism”. 359  The 
government finally implemented this mechanism in an ordinance in 2007.360 
(c) Federal Network Agency  
The new Energy Industry Act created the sector-specific regulator Federal 
Network Agency (BNA – Bundesnetzagentur) which includes the regulator for gas, 
telecommunications and postal services. “Authority had been split though. The federal 
regulator BNA is responsible for all network operators with more than 100,000 customers 
(and for network owners with less than 100,000 customers that operate in more than one 
state)”. 361  Therefore, the BNA performs tasks and executes powers which under the 
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Energy Industry Act have not been assigned to the state regulatory authorities. It is the 
Federal Network Agency’s central task to create the prerequisites for functioning 
competition on the upstream and downstream markets by unbundling and regulating the 
power supply grids. 362  The regulatory task of the BNA covers ensuring non-
discriminatory network access and the control of the network usage rates levies by the 
power supply companies.363 The Federal Network Agency’s range of tasks also includes 
the supervision of anti-competitive practices and the monitoring of the regulations 
concerning network areas and the system responsibility of the network operators.364 In 
contrast, objections to excessive rates for end customers continue to be dealt with by the 
federal states. Pricing of nationwide operating retailers is still controlled by the Federal 
Cartel Office.365 
Besides these key elements, the Energy Industry Act 2005 delegated the power 
to the government to issue various ordinances in order to continue and specify the 
liberalisation of the German electricity market in further steps. 
  
D Further Step: Ordinances after the Energy Industry Act 2005 
Section 24 of the Energy Industry Act 2005 provides an extensive list of areas in 
which the government has the possibility to enact an ordinance. Especially, questions to 
conditions of network access or network access fees should be – according to the 
different paragraphs of section 24 – specified by the government. In the last years, six 
important ordinances were enacted in respect of the German electricity market. 
1 Ordinances directly after the Energy Industry Act 2005 
 The first two ordinances were enacted very promptly after the enforcement of the 
Energy Industry Act 2005. On 29 July 2005, the ordinance on access to the electricity 
network (StromNZV - Stromnetzzugangsverordnung)366 as well as the ordinance on fees 
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for the access to the electricity network (StromNEV – Stromnetzentgeltverordnung) 367 
came into force.  
 The StromNZV should concretise the Energy Industry Act 2005 and thus serve 
the creation of a well functioning competition of the electricity market in Germany. 
Therefore, the grid should be open to everybody without any discriminatory conditions so 
that the different electricity suppliers can compete for the end customers in a fair manner. 
Consequently, the legislator gave the different distribution network operators and 
retailers permission to use the grid in order to supply the end customer with electricity (in 
terms of the Energy Industry Act 2005 this is called network access). So, the end 
customers would have nowadays a real chance to choose the retailer.368 
 To ensure the above described freedom of the end customer to choose, it is very 
important to establish equal conditions. On one hand equal conditions with respect to the 
determination of the fees which have to be paid for the network access. In this connection, 
the StromNEV provides the grid users with further regulation. On the other hand in terms 
of a detailed definition of the essential conditions how to access the network. This was 
done by the enforcement of the Strom NZV.369  
2 Ordinances in 2006/2007 
 In November 2006, the ordinance on the access to the distribution network (NAV 
– Niederspannungsanschlussverordnung) 370  and the ordinance on general terms and 
conditions for the basic electricity supply of the end customer (GVV Strom – 
Grundversorgungsverordnung Strom)371 came into force. The NAV provides regulations 
to general requirements for the network operators’ obligation to open the distribution 
network and its access according to section 18 of the Energy Industry Act 2005. 
Therefore, the NAV contains regulations concerning the network access and its usage, in 
detail, form and quality of the network access as well as regulations on its cancellation 
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and the use of land, measuring and the right of access. Furthermore, the NAV provides 
regulation on questions of liability which are very important in practice (section 18 of the 
NAV determines for example the maximum limits of liability on the part of the network 
operator in cases of blackouts et cetera). But the network operator’s liability is strictly 
limited because of the fact that the connection of electricity grids and the highly advanced 
engineered line system are particularly interference-prone. Consequently, this ordinance 
limits the liability with respect to maximum sum of compensation as well as the degree of 
negligence on the part of the network operator.372 
 The GVV Strom deals with the general terms and conditions under which the 
distribution network operator has to supply electricity. In this connection, section 2 of the 
GVV Strom provides the detailed requirements for the conclusion of a basic supply 
contract. Worth mentioning is a significant increase of the distribution network operator’s 
duty of notification. Furthermore, the GVV Strom contains provisions concerning the 
extent of the electricity supply, measurement and paying modalities. In addition, section 
19 of the GVV Strom allows the network operator to disconnect the end customer from 
the electricity supply in cases of serious infringements. 
The next ordinance was on the regulation of the network access for power 
stations (KraftNAV – Kraftwerks-Netzanschlussverordnung)373. It came into force in July 
2007 and aimed for the facilitation of the network access for new power station projects 
which should boost the competition. According to the ordinance, the network operator 
has the obligation to facilitate the network access provided that the connection is 
technically possible. If the connection is technically possible the network operator grants 
the consent to connect in return for payment of a fee. In the case of too many applicants 
for one connection point, the access will be allocated in the order of the arrival of the 
applications.374 
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3 Ordinance on incentive based regulation of the power grid 
Though the ordinance on incentive based regulation of the power grid (ARegV – 
Anreizregulierungsverordnung)375 came into force on the 6 November 2007, it will not be 
introduced until January 2009. 376  Turning away from the cost based approach, the 
German government finally decided for incentive based regulation which it had already 
planned in the Energy Industry Act 2005:377  
 
Incentive based regulation aims at improving the incentives of the regulated firm to produce 
efficiently. The means to do so is to allow the firm to keep the profits resulting from efficiency 
improvements. Not having to lower the (ex ante allowed) prices after lowering costs for some 
predetermined period is the incentive. 
 
The ordinance followed the Energy Industry Act 2005, more precisely section 
21a (2), which “highlighted the ex ante determination of the average revenue cap as the 
decisive point”. 378  The control period will be five years. The question of “relative 
efficiency will be determined by benchmarking with comparable firms”.379 Furthermore, 
“only the cost components which are under control of the firms will be subject to 
efficiency incentives”. 380 “The price cap regulation will be tariff basket, capping the 
weighted average price of a basket of products and leaving individual prices to the 
firm”.381 
The period of improving efficiency in the firm will be for the first time ten years 
(two control periods) and afterwards five years (one control period). 
 
                                               
375 Verordnung über die Anreizregulierung der Energieversorgungsnetze, BGBl. I, 2529. 
376 Section 3 (1) of the ARegV. 
377 See supra n 311, 249. 
378 Ibid, 250 
379 Ibid. 
380 Ibid. 
381 Ibid. 
70 
 
E Introduction to Renewable Energy: The Electricity Feed Act 1991 
1 Before the Electricity Feed Act 1991 
At the end of the 1970s it was agreed upon by the VDEW, VIK and BDI382, that 
the feeding of electricity generated from renewable sources should be compensated. From 
then on, they stipulated a minimum rate which should be paid to people who fed in 
electricity generated from renewables. 383 In the course of the next decade, a general 
discussion about environmental issues in Germany started. The German Green Party was 
founded and celebrated first successes in elections. Within this period of time many 
called for an increase of the remunerations for feeding. The aim was the increase of the 
share of electricity from renewable sources. As a consequence of this debate, Germany 
and its federal states had various political and parliamentary controversies which ended 
into the draft of the Electricity Feed Act in 1990.384 
2 The Electricity Feed Act 1991 
It came into force on 1 January 1991, and “for the first time ever obligated grid 
system operators to purchase renewable electricity generated by hydro-electric power, 
wind power, solar energy, landfill and sewage treatment plant gases and biomass, and to 
pay a fee for it”.385 According to the German government, the act came into force with the 
aim to increase the share of renewable energy in order to enhance issues of resources 
conservation and climate protection.386  
Section 1 limited the scope of the Electricity Feed Act to power stations with a 
capacity smaller than 5 MW. Additionally, the act was only valid for installations in 
which the state or the big electricity suppliers did not hold more than 25 per cent share of 
the power station. Section 3 divided the fees, which were paid, into two groups. 
Electricity from hydroelectric power, landfill gas, sewage treatment plant gas and 
                                               
382 Compare chapter III B 4. 
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biomass received 75 per cent of the average electricity price paid by the end user. 
Electricity generated from solar and wind power was remunerated at 90 per cent. 
 Until 1995, additional costs of NZ $ 250 million accrued for the obligated grid 
system operators from the Electricity Feed Act 1991. Half of this sum alone came from 
the electricity generated from wind power. Caused by this unequal development of 
electricity generated from renewable sources, the financial burdens of the different 
regional system operators in Germany were unequally distributed. The very high 
proportion of wind energy led to the problem, that the grid system operators, based in 
especially windy regions like the very north of Germany (the federal state Schleswig-
Holstein), faced unequally higher financial burdens than the operators in the rest of 
Germany.387 But the legislation set the market in motion and invigorated the wind power 
sector enormously. Between 1990 and 1999, almost 7500 new wind energy installations 
were commissioned (in 1990: 405 installations, in 1999: 7681).388 
Despite these great numbers, first and foremost the government of Schleswig- 
Holstein demanded an amendment of the Electricity Feed Act in order to distribute the 
financial burdens in a fairer manner. 
3 Reform of the Electricity Feed Act 
Already in 1996, the government of Schleswig-Holstein initiated a draft for the 
amendment of the Electricity Feed Act 1991.389 But it took longer than a year until a 
serious debate emerged between the different parties in the German parliament. There 
was a common consensus that the act had the desired effect to enhance the use of 
renewable energies.390 Finally on 29 April 1998, simultaneously with the Energy Industry 
Act 1998391, the Electricity Feed Act was reformed. The most important amendment was 
the introduction of a hardship clause. According to the new section 4 of the act, the 
transmission system operators should now compensate the regional system operators if 
                                               
387 See supra n 383, section 5. 
388  Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety Development of 
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the purchased renewable electricity was more than five per cent of the regional system 
operator’s sales volume. Furthermore, the transmission system operator’s duty to 
compensate was also capped which lead to a total cap of 10 per cent.  If the cap was 
reached, the duty to compensate new installations was interrupted for one year.392  
This amendment led to vehement protests of German environmental associations. 
In the meantime, there was a public debate whether the Electricity Feed Act 1991 and its 
amendments would be sufficient enough in order to achieve the environmental aims of 
Germany. For example in 1997, under the EU burden-sharing agreement to implement 
the Kyoto climate protocol, Germany had committed itself to reducing its GHG 
emissions by 21 per cent between 2008 and 2010, as compared to the 1990/1995 
emission levels. 
Besides the already in detail explained problem of the unequal distribution and 
its quite unsatisfying solution by using the hardship clause which resulted in a factual 
stop of investing in new installations for renewable energies, the enforcement of the 
Energy Industry Act 1998 also led to doubts whether the Electricity Feed Act was still 
sufficient. 393  Because the Energy Industry Act caused a liberalisation wave 394  which 
consequently led to a bigger circle of electricity suppliers who were back then affected by 
the Electricity Feed Act. Therefore, the Electricity Feed Act was revised and expanded. 
The new legislation came into force on 1 April 2000: The Act on granting priority to 
renewable energy sources (Renewable Energy Sources Act – RES Act). 
F The Renewable Energy Sources Act 2000 
Germans Ministry for Environment stated: 395 
 
 Replacing the Electricity Feed Act, the RES Act 2000 regulated the prioritisation of grid-
supplied electricity from renewable sources. It specified mechanisms for implementing the option of 
granting priority to renewable power generation envisaged in the EU Directive on the internal market in 
electricity. 
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 From April 2000, energy utilities also benefited from the compensation for 
supplying the grid with electricity from renewable sources.396 
The act targeted a 12 per cent share for electricity generated from renewable 
energy by 2010 (according to section 1, the declared purpose was too at least double the 
generation which was at about 6 per cent in 2000). The obligation to give grid access to 
renewable energy plants and purchase the electricity at premium prices was shifted from 
the utilities to the grid operators. The tariffs were set for each individual technology 
based on its actual generation cost. 397  “While under the Electricity Feed Act 
compensation rates were expressed as percentages of average customer tariffs, the new 
rates were now fixed for 20 years”398 after commissioning the plant.  
 
For wind power, they were made dependent on the quality of the location: all operators would 
receive a favourable rate for at least five years, thereafter the rate would decline, but later in the case of less 
favourable locations. Rates were particularly favourable for solar photovoltaic, offshore wind and biomass. 
At the same time, there now was an annual decline in compensation for most sources, not for existing 
installations but for new installations and determined by the year they would go on line.399  
 
“The act also stipulated obligations concerning costs of grid connection and 
reinforcement. Plant operators had now to pay for the grid connection, but the grid 
operator had to bear the cost of grid reinforcement if necessary”.400 
The act also solved the problems of unequal distribution of burdens (as in the 
Electricity Feed Act):401   
 
The costs of the feed-in mechanism are now socialised over all end users. Whilst under the old 
mechanism, each distribution network operator had to bear the total cost of electricity generated from 
renewable energy sources in their area individually, the RES Act 2000 established a mechanism whereby 
the costs are spread countrywide.  
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The distribution network operator, to which the RES plant is connected, is 
obliged to feed in the renewable electricity, but passes this on to one of the four big 
transmission system operators to which it is connected:402  
 
The transmission system operators spread the burden equally amongst them and calculate a 
nationwide compensation charge. They then pass it on proportionally to the suppliers in their region, who 
in turn pay the compensation charge and pass through the costs into the end user price. 
 
 The extra costs of this “balancing regulation” were calculated in 2004 to an 
amount of additional NZ $ 0.01 per kWh.403  
An additional ordinance issued in 2001 which biogenic substances and which 
technical processes are eligible for remuneration according to the Renewable Energy 
Sources Act.404 Originally, the remuneration to photovoltaic plants was limited to total 
capacity of 350 MW. In 2002, this cap was increased to 1000 MW. In November 2003, 
remuneration for photovoltaic installations was further differentiated depending on site 
specifics.405  
Every two years, the parliament re-evaluated the act on the basis of a report 
prepared by the Ministries of Economics and technology, in close consultation with the 
Ministry of Environment and the Ministry of Agriculture. This led to the Renewable 
Energy Sources Amendment Act 2004. But before this dissertation comes to these 
amendments in the RES Act, in the next chapter other incentives of a new energy policy 
in Germany will be presented. 
G The New Energy Policy of the Red-Green Coalition 
After a period of 16 years in which the conservative party (CDU) and the liberal 
party of Germany (FDP) were in power, the government changed in October 1998. The 
social democrats (SPD) and the green party took over and it was stated that: 406  
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The new red-green federal government emphasised ecological modernisation and climate change 
policy as well as job creation and socio-economic development; energy policy was to be a leading example. 
It included tax reform (eco-tax on energy), phasing out nuclear power, and strengthening of renewable 
energy sources and of combined heat and power. 
 
1 Eco-Tax Reform 
 
 This reform was passed as one of the first environmental initiatives of the new 
government in two consecutive laws which introduced a tax on the consumption of electricity (at a reduced 
rate for the industry) and raised existing mineral oil taxes, i.e. on petrol, diesel, natural gas and various 
mineral oils.407 
 
The electricity tax was gradually increased in the period from 1. April 1999 to 1 
January 2003. After the last raise, the tax rate was at about NZ $ 0.04 per kWh in 2004, 
which made up somewhat more than 11 per cent of the total price back then.408  
Since the law increased the price of fossil energy and exempted bio-fuels from 
the oil taxes, the eco-tax reform enhanced the competitive position of renewable energy 
technologies in the heating and transport markets. But electricity generation from 
renewable energy did not benefit directly from the tax because all electricity was taxed 
irrespective of the fuel used for generation. However, eco-tax revenues from electricity 
generated with renewable energies were used to finance several programmes.409 In 1999 
and 2000, the amount of about NZ$ 200 million per year “was reserved for renewable 
subsidies, particularly to finance the 100,000 roof programme”. 410  “This programme 
supported the installation or extension of photovoltaic systems”.411 Loans with interest 
rates of 4.5 per cent below market conditions were offered. “When the programme ended 
in July 2003, 55,000 installations with a total capacity of 261 MW had been 
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supported”.412 “At that point, the programme was terminated and the photovoltaic market 
development turned over to improved feed in tariffs”.413 
Another programme, sponsored by the eco-tax revenues, was the Market 
Stimulation Programme (Marktanreizprogramm). Under the auspices of the Ministry of 
Economics and Technology, it was introduced in 1999 with an annual budget of about 
NZ $ 200 million. For several reasons it was not possible to exempt renewable energy 
power plants from the eco tax. Nevertheless it was felt that this additional income should 
be used to the benefit of renewable energy technologies. Thus the annual NZ $ 200 
million represented the estimated additional tax revenue from renewable energy power 
plants due to the tax reform. “Under this scheme, individuals and small and medium-
sized businesses may apply for grants and soft loans for solar collectors, biomass boilers 
or heat pumps driven with renewable electricity”.414 
 This programme still exists to this date and has a budget of about NZ $ 700 
million for the year 2008. 
2 Nuclear power phase-out 
“The fundamental revision of nuclear politics reflected the consensus among the 
green party and many of the SPD” 415  since the worst nuclear power pant disaster in 
Chernobyl (former Soviet Union, nowadays Ukraine) back in 1986. It was stated that:416 
 
 The basic decision against the future construction of nuclear power plants was enshrined in the 
Nuclear Energy Phase-Out Act. The legislative process was characterised by the governments endeavour to 
reach a consensus with nuclear power interests and to avoid legal disputes before the courts. 
 
 Finally, “the agreement stipulated a generation limit based on a 32-year plant 
operation, which means that nuclear power will be phased out at around 2020 according 
to this plan”. 417 “However, companies have the option to shift allowances between plants 
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to increase the output in more efficient plants.”418 Until now only three of the twenty 
plants in Germany were closed. And in the latest study of the electricity generation mix in 
Germany, nuclear power is still one of the most important energy resources with a share 
of about 25 per cent of the total electricity generated in Germany.419 
Therefore, there is still a vehement discussion about the future of nuclear power, 
and whether Germany will need it beyond the stipulated phase out in order to secure the 
electricity supply. Many members of the conservative party CDU announced in the recent 
past that they want to do away with the above mentioned agreement and extend the 
plant’s lifetime. However, with the current conservative-socialist coalition, they will not 
find the majority to do so. 
3 Support for renewable energy sources and combined heat and power and end use 
efficiency  
RES and combined heat and power (CHP) are supported by the RES Act420 and 
the CHP Act respectively. These both acts work different in detail. “While the RES plants 
get a fixed remuneration depending on technology and plant size under the RES Act, the 
payment for CHP plants varies with the market price”.421 The act requires grid operators 
to purchase electricity from CHP plants and pay a premium on top of the market price: 422  
 
The arrangement is a result of stranded cost compensation, after it turned out that CHP became 
unprofitable after liberalisation. The CHP Act applies only to CHP plants that were in operation when the 
act entered into force and will be phased out. The act does only apply to new plants if they replace existing 
plants (modernisation) and for small plants. As a result, the CHP Act does little for investment which 
expands CHP capacity. 
 
As to end use efficiency, activities were initiated in line with EU policy. As a first step, the 
Energy Savings Ordinance (Energieeinsparverordnung) 423 entered into force in February 2002. It set the 
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total energy requirement of new buildings at 30 per cent below current standards; for old buildings 
insulation requirements and exchange of heating systems were prescribed. Several measures were taken in 
favour of renewable energy.424 
 
. Besides several programmes sponsored by the eco-tax revenue 425, the most 
important step was the enforcement of the Renewable Energy Sources Act 2000 and its 
amendment in 2004. 
G The Renewable Energy Sources Act 2004 
1 The first four years of the RES Act 
From 2000 to 2004 the RES Act already had shown its effectiveness. “The 
volume of electricity generated from renewable energies supported by” 426 the RES Act 
almost tripled (it increased from around 13.6 TWh to 34.9 TWh). “During the same 
period the act doubled the volume of electricity generated from wind and biomass, and 
brought a nine-fold increase in electricity generated from photovoltaic systems in 
Germany”.427 
 Another reason for the effectiveness was the structure of the RES Act which 
guaranteed a particularly high investment security, leading to relatively low credit interest 
rates and risk mark-ups. These were very good conditions for investors to loan money 
from the bank in order to finance new renewable energies installations. In other words, 
the decrease of the costs for renewable energy hinge largely on investment security which 
the RES Act gives to the investors. The Ministry for Environmenet stated that: 428 
 
 Furthermore, the lowering of fees as laid down in the RES Act for installations commissioned at 
a later date ensured further price reductions. This so called “degression” had already an impact: The costs 
for installing photovoltaic systems dropped by 25 per cent between 1999 and 2004. For wind turbines, costs 
were reduced by 30 per cent between 1993 and 2003. This “degression” also led to installations being 
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constructed as quickly as possibly in order to obtain a high payment level and ruled out the possibility for 
operators waiting until installation become cheaper.  
 
Additionally, the RES Act guaranteed a great incentive for operators to 
commission high-quality installations which are run as efficiently as possible (at least 
during the 20 years of paid tariffs) because the tariffs depend on the kw/h produced. 
“Therefore, operators demanded high standards from the installation manufacturers”.429 
2 The need to reform 
“In order to continue advancing the positive development of renewable energies 
in all sectors, and to adapt the RES Act to this development, it was amended on 1 August 
2004”. 430  The particular aims of the Renewable Energy Sources Act 2004 were the 
“further development of technologies for the generation of electricity from renewable 
energy sources”431 and “to increase the share of renewable energies in the total electricity 
supply to at least 12.5 per cent by 2010 and to at least 20 per cent by 2020”.432  
Other reasons for the amendment of the RES Act were the need to implement a 
European directive as well as the progress report 2002 on the RES Act433. Due to the 
European Directive on electricity production from renewable energy sources 
(2001/77/EC)434 there was need for further reforms. For example, according to article 5 of 
this directive, “every member state should have the duty to guarantee the origin of 
electricity produced from renewable energy sources”.435 
According to section 12 of the RES Act 2000, the Ministry of Economics had to 
do a progress report on the act every two years. On 28 June 2002, the first report was due 
and revealed that there was need to adjust the compensation rates which were different 
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for every technology in order to propel and optimise those technologies which had not 
been successfully enough established like offshore wind parks.436 
3 The regulations in detail 
In the following, this work will examine the most important amendments of the 
RES Act regulations. 
The new section 4 (which was the former section 3) still provided the 
regulations concerning the obligation to purchase and transmit. But the grid system 
operators should, after the amendment, “give immediate priority to connecting plants 
generating electricity from renewable energy sources”. 437 The word “immediate” was 
added and should show the growing importance of electricity generated from renewable 
energy sources once again. 
 Further amendments created incentives for plant operators of renewable energy 
sources “to agree with the grid operators on generation management in their mutual 
interest”.438”This was especially relevant for grid upgrading and stand-by energy. Such an 
agreement could take the –at times- fluctuating electricity supply into consideration in a 
way [that would enable to minimise] the cost for grid upgrades, reserves and stand-by 
energy”. 439  In order “to facilitate better integration of renewable energies into the 
electricity system” 440, the RES Act 2004 contained, according to new section 5, “an 
obligation to measure and record the capacity for plants with a capacity of 500 kW or 
more”.441 
As already pointed out, the RES Act stipulated “fixed tariffs which grid 
operators had to pay for the feed in of electricity from”442 renewable energy sources. The 
new sections 6 to 11 replaced the former sections 4 to 8 and regulated the minimum 
payments for the different energy sources. For 2005, fees under the RES Act 2004 ranged 
from about NZ $ 0.10 per kWh for electricity from wind energy up to about NZ $ 1.20 
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for solar electricity from small façade systems. “In principle, the guaranteed payment 
period was and is 20 calendar years”443, but new section 12 provided for hydropower 
generated electricity a period of either 15 or 30 years (depending on capacity). “The fee, 
valid for the year of commissioning, remained constant, for this period, with the 
exception of wind energy. For wind-generated electricity, special regulations were laid 
down in section 10”. 444 For onshore wind parks the regulations remained pretty much 
constant (starting fee paid for five years, afterwards fee depends on wind conditions at 
the site), but offshore wind parks were promoted with the enforcement of the RES Act 
2004. “Starting fees for offshore wind parks were paid for 12 years. This period was even 
extended for installations located further from the coastline and erected in deeper 
water”.445 While the payment rate for wind energy on land was slightly lowered and 
cancelled in cases of wind parks which could not achieve at least 60 per cent of the 
reference yield at the planned location, higher starting fees for offshore wind parks were 
paid under the RES Act 2004. Furthermore, the RES Act 2004 extended the period for 
the payment of offshore wind parks for four more years (from 2006 to 2010).446 The 
Ministry for Environment stated that:447 
 
In order to take account technological developments and their economic efficiency, and to 
optimise the use of cost reduction potential, the tariffs for most branches were degressive in structure. The 
degression annually lowered the payment in rates in all branches for new installations (except small 
hydropower plants). For installed plants, the fee valid for the respective year of commissioning applied for 
the entire payment period.  
 
Compared with the RES Act 2000, the new act provided “for a more 
differentiated fee structure, taking efficiency aspects into account. In particular, the 
payment conditions for geothermal energy and biomass were improved”.448 In the case of 
modernisation and expansion of existing large hydro power plants, “the additional 
                                               
443 Ibid. 
444 Ibid. 
445 See supra n 419, 5. 
446 Ibid. 
447 Ibid. 
448 Ibid. 
82 
 
electricity generated is included in the fee. The degressive structure was strengthened and 
further developed”.449 Furthermore, the Ministry for Environment stated that: 450 
 
For the area of bio energy, in addition to the minimum fees laid down, the new version of the 
RES Act provided for additional fees (bonuses), if the electricity was exclusively produced from self-
regenerating raw materials, combined heat-power, or if the biomass was converted using innovative 
technologies (e.g. thermal chemical gasification, fuel cells, gas turbines, etc.).  
 
The bonuses could be used additionally. 
 Furthermore, the RES Act 2004 gave:451   
 
Greater consideration to aspects of nature conservation, in particular with regard to the use of 
hydropower, photovoltaic and wind energy. To improve transparency, the act introduced an obligation on 
the part of the grid operators to publish energy volumes and payment figures” (section 15). To improve 
information on the increased use of renewable energies, the RES Act 2004 initiated the creation of an 
installation register (also section 15). In accordance with the provisions laid down by the Directive 
2001/77/EC, the RES Act 2004 allowed authorised bodies to issue guarantee of origin for electricity from 
renewable energy (section 17). This should promote consumer information and protection.  
 
Section 18 forbade that electricity produced from renewable energy sources 
could be sold or otherwise transferred more than once. This prohibition of multiple sales 
was only introduced due to reasons of clarification. Of course, it was not allowed under 
the Electricity Feed Act and the RES Act 2000 but it was not explicitly regulated.452 
H The Integrated Energy and Climate Programme 
In the spring of 2007, meeting under the German presidency, the Ministry for 
Environment stated that: 453 
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The European Council set the parameters for an integrated European climate and energy policy. 
It included ambitious climate protection targets, as well as it aimed at the expansion of renewable energies 
and increases in energy efficiency. With the key elements of an integrated energy and climate programme 
set out in the following, the German government implemented these fundamental European policy 
decisions at national level by means of a concrete programme of measures. The guiding principles 
remained the three objectives of security of supply, economic efficiency and environmental protection. 
 
At its meeting in Meseberg, a castle in the middle between Berlin and Hamburg, 
in August 2007, the German government “adopted an ambitious energy and climate 
programme, consisting of 29 key elements. On 5 December 2007 the government 
submitted a comprehensive package of 14 acts and ordinances. Another smaller package 
containing further legislative proposals [followed in May 2008]”.454 
Hence, in time for the 13th Conference of Parties to the UN Framework 
Convention on Climate Change from 3 to 14 December 2007 in Bali, the German 
government had elaborated “an integrated energy and climate programme that set global 
standards and set out an appropriate response for a modern economy”. 455 Before the 
negotiations about the future of international climate protection had even begun, 
Germany adopted a concrete programme of action to implement strategic EU decisions at 
national level. After all, energy and climate policy could only be credible if ambitious 
aims are backed by practical measures. “No other comparable industrialised country had 
and has an equally ambitious and concrete programme”.456 
In the following, this dissertation will try to present the major aspects of the 
Integrated Energy and Climate Programme (IECP). Of course, it will predominantly 
concentrate on the measures which are directly influencing the German electricity market 
and the use of renewable energy sources respectively. And key element two, the 
expansion of renewable energies in the power sector is consequently the most important 
one for this dissertation and will be discussed in detail. After this, a concise overview of 
other – for the electricity market – important measures will be illustrated. 
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1 Expansion of renewable energies in the power sector 
Within this key element certain measurements were planned which will be 
illustrated in the following. 
(a) Amendment to the Renewable Energy Sources Act 
First and foremost, the Renewable Energy Sources Act 2004 will be amended in 
2009. The government’s goal is that “the expansion of renewable energies should 
continue and that its share in electricity consumption in Germany should be increased to 
25 – 30 per cent by 2020, with continued steady expansion thereafter”. 457 While retaining 
its fundamental structure, “a fine-tuning of the RES Act would be required to facilitate an 
optimum response to the current situation at all times”. 458  The most important key 
measures to the amendment of the RES Act can be found in the Progress Report 2007 
which is required every two years under section 20 of the RES Act. According to this 
report, “improvements in the expansion of offshore wind energy”459 as well as better 
incentives for re-powering old onshore wind energy systems would be needed. 
Furthermore, “better conditions for electricity generation from biomass” 460  would be 
required. “In particular, the fees paid to small scale biomass and especially biogas plants 
as well as bonuses for combined heat and power and the use of cultivated biomass”461 
would have to be increased. Also, the progress report demanded “a boost for the 
expansion of geothermal activity generation, especially through higher fees and 
investment subsidies”462 in order to cover drilling risks for example. A further measure 
needed, should be the: 463 
 
Adjustment of fees payable for electricity from photovoltaic electricity. The high rate of growth 
in photovoltaics resulted in a decrease in manufacturing costs, which would offer scope for a one-off 
reduction in fees and an increase in the rate of degression”. 
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 Lastly, “measures to avoid powering down of renewable energy plants due to 
grid bottle necks should be planned. To this end, grid integration should be improved and 
optimised feed in management introduced”.464 
(b) Regulation on the demarcation of areas for specific uses at sea 
The IECP envisaged “spatial planning in Germany’s Exclusive Economic Zone 
in the form of a regulation issued by the Federal Ministry of Transport demarcating areas 
for specific uses at sea, in particular offshore wind energy”. 465  This includes the 
designation of priority areas. “The legal impact of this status would be that any other use 
not compatible with the designated priority must be disallowed or denied authorisation, 
thereby ring-fencing potential locations for offshore wind farms”. 466 The government’s 
strategy for offshore wind energy use aims for the installation of wind turbines with a 
combined capacity of up to 25,000 MW by 2030. 
(c) Support strategy for re-powering wind turbines 
The IECP envisaged a support strategy for re-powering wind turbines within the 
framework of master building development planning and regional planning (in 
partnership with the federal states and associations of local authorities). “One major 
component would be developing onshore wind conversion by supporting the re-powering 
process, i.e. replacing smaller, older wind turbines with low output, of the kind built in 
the 1990s by state-of-art- turbines with greater capacity”. 467  This step would increase 
energy efficiency, diminish the aesthetic strain on the landscape by cutting site scatter, 
and reduce the negative impact on humans and the environment (e.g. by enhanced turbine 
features, site selection and concentration).  
Solitary wind turbines had been a frequent phenomenon, particularly in the 
1990s, encouraging an “asparagus effect in the landscape”, a new phrase in the German 
language meaning the transformation of the German landscape into an asparagus field. 
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Concentrating turbines in wind farms and removing lone turbines would make it easier to protect the 
landscape visually. Apart from improving the commercial incentives by amending the RES Act, re-
powering would call for support in achieving the parallel objective of “tidying” the landscape, in particular 
from master planning for building development, but also from regional planning. Current law would 
already provide for the instruments required, but there would be a need for practical application 
guidance.468 
(d) Grid expansion and undersea cables 
Like already mentioned, rapid expansion of the share of renewable energies is 
one of the key elements in the government’s Energy and Climate Programme adopted at 
the Meseberg meeting. In order to realise this aim Germany needs “new high-voltage 
transmission lines, above all to carry electricity following the proposed expansion of 
wind energy (offshore and onshore), but also to connect proposed new power stations to 
the grid and handle the increase in cross-border power trading”.469 However, delays could 
be and can still be expected in planning procedures and in the construction of cable 
systems. Therefore, the government adopted the following measures to speed up grid 
expansion: The adoption of an Energy Grid Expansion Act which will permit the 
definition of priority needs for transmission cables and include a bundled approval 
procedure for undersea cables connecting offshore wind turbines when urgent new grid 
construction is undertaken. Model guidelines are to be drawn up for energy grid approval 
procedures, after which they will made be available to planning authorities in the federal 
states. To standardise the administrative practice which often varies from one federal 
state to another would make it easier for project agencies to prepare for these approval 
procedures. Furthermore, judicial simplification was considered, more precisely 
shortening the judicial procedure for planning decisions relating to priority projects, 
focusing on a single chamber at Higher Administrative Court in the region with 
jurisdiction and relinquishing the appeal to the Federal Court. Lastly, several 
amendments to the Energy Industry Act were proposed like the prolonged validity of 
offshore connection rules defined in section 118 (7) of the Energy Industry Act, or 
detailed measures for cost efficient, need-oriented grid expansion (section 11), or the 
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expansion of the duty to report in section 12 (3a) with regard to include concrete 
measures to expand the grids within a defined time frame. Furthermore, rules were 
planned to ensure that grid operators bear the burden of substantiation and proof if they 
refuse a grid connection on the ground that it is commercially unacceptable.470  
2 Other important measures 
An overview of important key element of the IECP is now following: 
(a) Smart metering 
“The metering of electricity consumption in Germany had not kept pace with 
progress. Usually meters in households and small and medium sized companies were 
only read once a year”.471 The government wanted to reform this in order to offer people 
the possibility to keep close track of what they are using, both to manage their own 
consumption and that energy service contracting could be optimised. Therefore, the 
government’s objective was the “rapid dissemination of new technologies in a liberalised 
power metering environment, enabling consumers to know exactly how they are 
consuming power”.472 
On 9 September 2008 the amendment to the Energy Industry Act on liberalising 
metering was enforced. It set out to open the market beyond the operation of meters for 
electricity and gas to the actual reading and data processing. Network operators have 
hitherto been responsible for measuring consumption, even when the meters are already 
being operated by a different company. This activity is now to be opened completely to 
competition. The liberalisation envisaged in the act is designed not only to help tap into 
price advantages for consumers, but above all to promote technical innovation in meter 
design and management, and also concepts for smart networks. The aim is to establish 
conditions for the introduction of intelligent digital meters, partly to encourage a broader 
offering of variable load-related tariffs. Wherever their installation makes economic 
sense, these new technologies permitting the management of consumption should become 
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more widespread in commercial, industrial and household environments and should be 
ready for use in six years.473 
(b) Support programmes for climate protection and energy efficiency 
Other key elements of the IECP included support programmes in the fields of 
international climate protection, energy efficiency, renewable energies and other 
domestic measures to protect the climate. The objective of these planned programmes is 
to provide consultancy and economic incentives for climate protection and energy 
efficiency without incurring excessive costs. “As announced by Chancellor Merkel 
during Germany’s presidency of the G8, some of the proceeds from the sale of emission 
allowances could be used for climate protection measures in newly industrialising and 
developing countries”.474  
In the productive sector, small and medium-sized businesses had so far been 
slow to tap the potential for energy efficiency, especially due to financial limits and a 
lack of information. Consequently the Federal Ministry of Economics and its lending 
facility have put together a promotional programme, the Special Fund for Energy 
Efficiency in Small and Medium Sized Businesses that began in 2008. “Grants are to be 
paid for independent, expert consultancy provided to companies about energy efficiency. 
Low-interest loans are available to fund company investments in energy-saving measures 
that generate major energy-saving impacts”.475  
Private households would often lack detailed information about energy 
efficiency measures. Therefore, Germany supports them with over 400 consumer advice 
centres and a common nationwide website in order to offer energy consulting to private 
households. The advice includes a thorough survey of the building and a comprehensive 
report with detailed proposals or action packages for optimising the energy balance of 
thermal insulation and heating systems. From 2008 on, the programme became much 
more attractive because of a higher grant for consultancy as well as broader conditions of 
eligibility.476 
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Another objective of the IECP is the energy-efficient modernisation of federal 
buildings. The programme for the energy-efficient modernisation of federal buildings 
was launched in 2006 in order to renovate public buildings to improve their energy 
performance, especially reduce building specific GHG emissions.  Between 2006 and 
2009 the programme should have made a total of about NZ$ 950 million available for 
work on buildings and systems in federal civil and military properties. But the IECP 
approved an extension of the programme for further two years until 2011.477  
Furthermore, general administrative rules/guidelines on the procurement of 
energy-efficient products and services were planned. By adopting such rules or 
guidelines, the German government would set a good example to others. Therefore, 
energy-efficient appliances and services are promoted with the aid of preferential 
procurement. 478  For energy efficient products a wide scale market introduction was 
planned. Via standards and clear consumer friendly labelling for all energy using 
appliances the German government wants to achieve the European energy efficient target 
(20 per cent efficiency gain compared with business as usual through European eco-
design and energy consumption label).479 
Also an expansion of the energy efficiency and information campaign of the 
German Energy Agency started after the IECP. Since 2002, the agency had been 
conducting nationwide campaigns about the efficient use of electricity and the future of 
buildings. The aim is to network participants and create action platforms for projects 
designed to achieve an efficient use of electricity in all consumption sectors and energy-
efficient construction. Specifically targeted campaigns and projects inform end users in 
private households, industry and commerce and the service sector about ways they can 
use electricity efficiently and about energy-efficient trading and construction. The 
intention is to build on these various information vehicles and campaigns that the German 
Energy Agency pursued and still pursues.480  
As a last important key element for this dissertation, the IECP provided 
consolidation of market incentive programme for renewable energies. It included 
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measures relating to the use of renewable energies for heating. To secure a steady market 
development, the promotion of renewable energy technologies with discerning technical 
standards continued 2008. The eligibility criteria geared more strongly towards 
innovation, efficiency and hybrid scenarios. Support expanded to include, for example, 
the costs of deep geothermal drilling, mini district heating networks (in addition to the 
Combined Heat and Power Act if the feed includes a certain minimum of share of 
renewables), and high performance heat pumps with a renewable component, and biogas 
processors. The support will be adjusted accordingly when obligations to use renewables 
are imposed by the Renewable Energies Heat Act 2009 “(renewable energies in the heat 
sector offer huge potential for climate protection and savings in fossil fuels. The share of 
renewable energies in heat provision will therefore be increased to 14 per cent by 
2020”481 according to this act). 
 
IV CONCLUDING COMPARISON 
Chapter II and III of this dissertation tried to illustrate the most important 
electricity market reforms of New Zealand and Germany. Furthermore, the handling of 
the in the last two decades emerged question of sustainable electricity was scrutinised. In 
this chapter, the dissertation tries to summarise and compare the most important measures 
of New Zealand and Germany. In addition, it will try to take a look into the future of 
these both countries. Concluding, the dissertation will explain the – at the beginning – 
held thesis which of these both countries is on a better way in the 21st century concerning 
the secure and sustainable supply of electricity. 
But before the findings of the last two chapters will be presented, a general 
overview over the numbers of these both countries electricity generation follows. 
 
A Electricity generation in New Zealand and Germany 
At first sight, the objectives of New Zealand and Germany do not seem 
comparable. On one hand, the government of New Zealand set the primary target in the 
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NZES to accomplish “that 90 per cent of electricity will be generated from renewable 
sources by 2025”.482 On the other hand, the German government defined - quite recently 
in the draft of the RES Act 2009 – its goal to increase the share of renewable electricity 
generation to at least 30 per cent by 2020. 
But the following numbers will show that the latter objective of the German 
government is more ambitious than the goal of New Zealand. Besides the enormously 
differing population of these both countries, and therefore also unequal demand and 
supply of electricity, the history of electricity generation of these both countries has to be 
considered. 
1 New Zealand 
 The New Zealand energy system has largely been built around the 
“transmission of electricity generated in the southern hydro-lakes to major load centres 
further north. This has given the country relatively cheap and sustainable supply of 
renewable electricity”.483 In 2007, the total gross production of electricity was about 43 
TW per hour. Around 67 per cent of this number was from renewable sources. 484  
Generation from non-renewable energy sources was less in 2007 than in 2006 with a 1 
per cent decrease in total generation from these sources. The share of electricity 
generated by coal was almost halved in 2007 with the consequence that coal represented 
only 7 per cent of the total electricity generation in New Zealand. This significant 
decrease in coal generation can be attributed to the new Huntly e3p gas combined cycle 
plant which came online in 2007 and displaced much of the generation from the older 
coal-fired Huntly units. Therefore, gas represents almost 80 per cent of non renewable 
sources and has a share of more than 26 per cent of the total electricity generation in New 
Zealand.485 
But the more interesting issue for this dissertation is the share of renewable 
electricity generation. In the following, this chapter gives a short overview over the mix 
and the numbers of the renewable energy sources in New Zealand. 
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(a)  Hydro generation  
The biggest share of renewable electricity has been from hydro generation, 
namely about 82 per cent. Historically, electricity from hydro generation has always been 
a big part of New Zealand’s energy system. Already one century ago, the government 
commissioned hydro plants such as Waipori and Coleridge. In 1965, the high voltage 
direct current transmission line between the South and the North Island was 
commissioned. From this point onwards, hydro capacity in the South Island exploded. By 
the 1990s, hydro capacity had reached it zenith and remains around this level today. Most 
new hydro developments currently under consideration are relatively small.486 
(b) Geothermal generation 
Geothermal generation has for a long time been and still is the second largest 
renewable resource and continues to play a significant role in 2007 with around 12 per 
cent of total net electricity generation from renewable energy sources. The first 
geothermal power station, Wairakei, was opened 50 years ago and remains, after a binary 
plant was added in 2005, New Zealand’ largest geothermal power station.487 
(c) Wind generation 
From 2006 to 2007, wind generation increased about 50 per cent and is now the 
third most important source for renewable electricity generation with a share of about 3 
per cent. It is, compared to hydro and geothermal generation, a quite young technology in 
New Zealand. The first wind farm, Hau Nui, was commissioned only a decade ago. 
Today New Zealand’s largest wind farm, Tararu, provides the half of the total capacity 
generated by wind.488 But further big projects are already under construction (West Wind) 
or at least consented (Hawke’s Bay Wind Farm).489 
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(d) Generation from other resources 
Biomass, biogas and solar energy are mainly used directly for heating and as 
biofuels for commercial and industry applications and do not play a significant role for 
New Zealand’s electricity generation.490 
Marine energy has been identified as a promising source of electricity 
generation:491  
A project to trial a tidal stream turbine in the Cook Strait was granted a permit in April 2008, and 
a council hearing was held in May 2008 to consider an application to install marine turbines in the Kaipara 
Harbour. Additionally, at least 14 wave and tidal stream technologies are currently being investigated 
around New Zealand. 
2 Germany      
In 2007, the total gross production of electricity was about 636 TW per hour in 
Germany. Around 86 per cent of this number was generated from non renewable sources. 
The main energy source for electricity generation is coal, “which accounts for around 50 
per cent of the electricity production, with hard coal and lignite each accounting for about 
half of this”. 492 “Yet German hard coal is about three to four times as expensive as 
imported coal and relies on state subsidies”.493 “Since the number of miners has become 
too small to a serious interest group and the commission of the European Union does not 
allow the subsidy, it is gradually reduced”. 494  But experts say that this would “not 
influence the generation mix or investment decisions, which are based on the price of 
imported coal, but would reduce domestic coal consumption and increase coal 
imports”.495 “Lignite is the only other major domestic energy resource in Germany. As it 
can be accessed through open cast mines, it is relatively cheap and does not require state 
subsidies”. 496  “The downside is that open cast mines consume vast chunks of land, 
leading to significant public opposition”.497 As already discussed498, nuclear plants still 
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generate a quarter of Germany’s electricity despite the phase-out programme. Another 10 
per cent comes from the electricity generation from gas. 
Renewable energy sources had a share of about 14 per cent of Germany’s 
electricity generation in 2007. Similar to the first part of this chapter, in which New 
Zealand’s electricity generation was examined, this work takes a closer look on the 
renewable electricity mix of Germany. 
(a) Wind generation 
 In 2007, a total of 883 new wind turbines were installed in Germany, bringing 
the overall number of wind turbines for electricity generation to 19, 460 all over 
Germany. With a total share of more than 6 per cent of the gross electricity generation, 
wind power was and still is by far the most important renewable energy source in 
Germany. However, the German government states that there would be still considerable 
potential by developing suitable sites “in Germany’s southern states, and by replacing 
small-scale old turbines by larger new turbines”.499 
Also, the German government has big plans concerning offshore wind energy 
use, which will be discussed later. 
(b) Hydro generation 
With the Electricity Feed Act and its successor, the RES Act, “electricity 
generation from hydropower has been maintained at a high level”. 500  Since 1990, the 
gross electricity production of hydropower is around 20 TW per hour, which means a 
share of over 3 per cent of the total electricity generated in Germany. The German 
government acknowledges that electricity production from hydropower could be only 
increased slightly by modernisation of outdated technologies in existing plants as well as 
new constructions, especially at transverse structures.501  
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(c) Biomass generation 
 Similar to the wind generation, the contribution of biomass to the electricity 
generation exploded in Germany from 1990 to 2007. Due to the Electricty Feed Act and 
the RES Act the share of this renewable raw material (such as wood but also plants’ and 
animals’ waste) could be almost centupled in the last 17 years (from 0.2 TW per hour to 
19.5 TW per hour in 2007. Along “with landfill and sewage gas and biogenic share of 
waste, more electricity was produced from biomass (total sum of 23.8 TW per hour) than 
from hydropower for the first time in 2007”.502 Additionally, the “contribution of biomass 
to heat supply totalled around 84 TW per hour” 503 which was about 93 per cent of all 
renewable energy sources in this sector. 
According to the German government, “the use of bioenergy should be further 
expanded. The technical potential required for this would be available in Germany. In the 
agricultural and forestry sector” 504, around 30 million hectares of agricultural land and 
woodland would be available for biomass production.  
(d) Solar generation 
In Germany, options for exploiting solar energy include “solar thermal heat use 
through solar panels, passive solar use” 505  and, of particular importance for this 
dissertation, electricity generation using photovoltaic installations. By the end of 2007, 
“over 9.6 million square metres of sun collectors were installed in Germany”. 506  
Especially the RES act 2004 with the increase of fees for photovoltaic installations 
caused a boost for the electricity generation from solar energy (from about 0.5 TW per 
hour in 2004 to 3.5 ZW per hour in 2007). With the new Renewable Energies Heat Act507, 
entering into force on 1 January 2009, and its obligation to use renewable energy for heat 
supply in new buildings, solar energy will also increase its share in the heat supply.508 
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3 Comparison 
In order to analyse above mentioned numbers properly, the fact has to be 
considered that New Zealand and Germany have such a big difference in population and 
consequently also in demand and supply of electricity. While New Zealand’s electricity 
generation supplied their 4.3 million inhabitants with 43 TW per hour in 2007, Germany 
generated electricity of about 636 TW per hour for their population of 82.1 million in the 
same year. Therefore, leaving the percentages (share of renewable electricity in NZ: 67 
per cent, in Germany: 14 per cent) behind, it has to be considered that Germany 
generated more than three times more electricity from renewable sources than New 
Zealand.   
Another significant aspect is the big difference in electricity consumption 
between the inhabitants of these both countries. Comparing the above mentioned 
numbers, New Zealanders are consuming 30 per cent more electricity per capita than 
Germans. 
Contemplating the different renewable sources, it stands out that New Zealand 
has a long history in generation from hydroelectric plants. It always played a big part in 
the electrical supply of New Zealand. Therefore, the electricity generation from 
renewable sources in New Zealand was and still is very orientated on hydro generation. 
Consequently, the electricity generation from wind and solar energy has been disregarded 
for a long time and only started to develop in the recent times. In contrast, the situation in 
Germany is very different. In 1990, electricity generation from renewable sources – with 
the exception of hydro generation – was practically non-existent. Nowadays, a very big 
share of renewable electricity comes from the comparatively new technologies like wind 
and solar generation as well as electricity generation from biomass. As seen in chapter 
III, Germany developed a system of fees, supporting the feed in of electricity from 
renewable sources into the grid, already in 1991. With the enforcement of the RES Act in 
2000, this system became very elaborate. Therefore, Germany was far ahead of New 
Zealand and also the rest of the world, with regard of developing and supporting 
renewable energy technologies. This led and still leads to Germany being a role model in 
this sector and also becoming the export hit in terms of regulation and technology. Within 
a short space of time, the RES Act “has developed into an international model and has 
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paved the way for the promotion of renewable electricity production”.509 By the end of 
2005, 32 of 49 nations, which had set themselves certain goals for renewable electricity, 
decided for legislation, using the supported feed in principle. “Even India and China 
introduced comparable support instruments”.510 
In the wind energy sector Germany is leading the market with a share of about 
30 per cent of all installed wind capacity all over the world. Therefore, it does not come 
as a big surprise that wind turbines with the tag “Made in Germany” are wanted all over 
the world. On average and estimating conservatively, the export quota of wind 
installation manufactures increased from 55 per cent in 2006 to 70 per cent in 2007. The 
resulting turnover was more than NZ $ 10 billion which is around 7 per cent over the 
value of 2006.511  
Due to their success the German businesses in the renewable energies sector are 
a unique job machine. From 2004, the year of the amended RES Act, the number of 
people employed in this sector rose from 157,000 people to the total estimated 
employment figure of 249,000 employees for 2007. Around 75 per cent of this number 
came from the well established wind energy sector and the fast rising supply of biomass 
(increase of almost 30,000 jobs within the last three years).512 From this increase of nearly 
60 per cent numerous professional groups are benefiting because the generation of 
renewable energy covers the entire supply chain: From manufacturing the components 
and developing the installations down to planning the project.513 
 But being now one of the global players concerning renewable electricity 
technologies was a long and hard way for Germany. In the next two chapters, this paper 
wants to compare the most important reforms which have been taken by the both 
countries’ governments in order to tackle the problems on the way to deliver sustainable 
and secure electricity to their people. 
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B Comparison of the Electricity Market Reforms in Both Countries 
The starting points of these both countries’ markets were different. While New 
Zealand’s electricity market became economically unviable in the 1980s and the 
government was forced to reform the electricity industry in order to reach the best 
outcome for the country’s economy, the first big German electricity market reform did 
not come from the inside. Germany had to implement a directive of the European Union 
in 1998. Until 1984, the generation and transmission system in New Zealand was 
completely state-owned and aimed at supplying the New Zealanders with cheap 
electricity, understanding the electricity sector as social service. But this monopoly could 
only work as long New Zealand’s economy was prospering. In Germany, the state played 
only a subsidiary role, holding shares in a few electricity generators. The sector was 
never institutionally monopolised. Instead a handful of privately owned big utilities 
owned and operated the transmission grids and most of the power plants. But the 
disadvantage of this oligopoly was that these firms, both transmission system operators 
and dominant generators, had agreements dividing the German electricity market into 
approximately equal parts, avoiding competition among themselves Therefore, electricity 
prices were never as cheap as they could be. 
So, on one hand there was New Zealand and its state-owned model, where the 
electricity prices were relatively cheap at the expense of New Zealand’s Treasury. On the 
other hand, the big players of Germany’s electricity supply system were economically 
well positioned but the consumers had to suffer higher electricity prices. 
Therefore, New Zealand’s more urgent need to reform, caused by the 
economically not viable and monopolistic state-owned system, resulted in earlier efforts. 
As seen in chapter II B and C, New Zealand took UK as a role model and initiated the 
liberalisation of the electricity market already in the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
Compared to Germany’s first liberalisation wave in 1998, it seems that New Zealand was 
far ahead. But it has to be taken into account that the first efforts like the SOE Act 1986 
and the Electricity Act 1992 aimed inter alia on targets which had been the status quo in 
Germany (e.g. ending the state-owned monopoly). On the other hand, the efforts of New 
Zealand’s government were quite progressive and innovative for these times. As the first 
country, New Zealand adopted the light-handed approach to electricity regulation, trying 
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to solve the danger of power market abuse and its problems without installing an industry 
regulator. Within the EU, Germany was the only country which followed this approach in 
1998. Also, the legal measures to remove statutory distribution and retail monopolies as 
well as enforcing provisions for information disclosure concerning the market structure 
and prices came comparatively early in New Zealand in 1993 and 1994. Similar reforms 
were enforced in Germany not until 1998. But unlike in New Zealand, where - despite the 
above mentioned reform - the local electricity companies still used their market power in 
distribution to exclude competition at the retail level, the German efforts went further. 
From the start and at that time in 1998, 100 per cent end user eligibility was very unique 
in Europe and went far beyond the required measures in the European directive. 
Nevertheless, after several years the German electricity market had to cope with the same 
problems as the market in New Zealand. The big electricity firms gained their profits not 
in generation or retail but in the wire business through inadequately high prices.  
Contemplating the outcome of these both countries’ measures in numbers, the 
results in Germany were distinctly better than in New Zealand. Especially commercial 
customers benefited from the reforms. An estimated 65 per cent either switched the 
retailer or negotiated better prices with the old one.514 These numbers could not even 
close be achieved in New Zealand. And although the reforms resulted in savings to 
industrial and commercial customers, private households experienced further price raises 
in New Zealand. In Germany, at least one third of the private households switched their 
retailer or negotiated better conditions for their contracts due to the reforms.515 Better 
results regarding the private households were impeded by the anticompetitive consumer 
behaviour. In particular, consumers of small and medium local and regional retail 
companies, still mostly owned by the municipalities, show a high grade of loyalty and 
simply refuse to switch, even when the prices are higher than of any competitor in the 
area. Explanation for this anticompetitive behaviour is that these companies have 
traditionally strong positions in the communities. They usually play a major part in the 
infrastructure and social life as a major local employer or as an important local investor. 
Therefore, higher prices are mostly accepted because the municipalities are benefiting 
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from the companies’ profits.  Consumers, especially in rural areas and smaller cities, are 
not willing to increase profits of not regional or even foreign companies.516 
 However, the electricity prices in Germany also started to increase significantly 
again three years after the reform in 1998. Like before mentioned, the big electricity 
companies in both countries abusing their market power were responsible for holding the 
competition down, and therefore increasing the retail prices. 
The countries had different answers to this dilemma. New Zealand responded by 
introducing and passing the Industry Reform Act 1998. The mandatory separation of the 
monopoly distribution businesses from the contestable retail/generation businesses were 
the key feature. Mandatory separation is an extreme policy response to the competition 
issues raised by vertically integrated networks: it makes vertical integration illegal. It is 
self evident that a vertically integrated network has incentives to make access difficult or 
expensive where it is competing in the downstream contestable market with the access-
seeker, but has no such incentives if it is a stand-alone network industry which does not 
compete in the upstream or downstream market. However, mandatory separation of the 
network and energy businesses was necessary only because light-handed regulation had 
failed. The government was not prepared to introduce an access model along the lines 
developed in other jurisdictions. In the absence of an effective access regime, the only 
alternative was mandatory separation.517 
Germany, three to five years in the development - compared to New Zealand - 
behind,   also tried handed the light-handed approach at first and opted for the negotiated 
Third Party Access. But Germany’s reasons for the weak rules on unbundling of the 
vertically integrated monopolistic networks were multiple. On one hand, the big issue is 
that the big electricity companies are largely in private hands. The obligation to split off 
the grid system operators from the rest of the firm could mean under certain conditions 
expropriation and would violate the constitution. Besides this legal problem, there had 
been several political considerations why the government decided for the light-handed 
approach first. First, the electricity supply industry had and still has a quite big influence 
on politics. The big companies’ directors and managers have a lot of friends in the 
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parties. And it is not unusual that politicians get a good job in the board of a big 
electricity company after their careers in the government or parliament. Second, the 
electricity sector is considered to be strategic. Facing counterparts like the Russian giant 
Gazprom, the government hesitates to fragment the industry too heavily and tries to 
balance between competition and countervailing power. In this context, there has always 
been this competitiveness of having the biggest and best company within Europe. 
Therefore, the European governments tend to create and support their “national 
champions”. Lastly, the West German firms committed themselves to invest heavily in 
the former East after the reunification in the 1990s. The light-handed regulation might 
have been something like a reward for all the money the big companies had spent.518  
Retrospectively, the light-hand approach, both in New Zealand and in Germany, 
failed. Both countries’ industries were not capable of regulating themselves. In New 
Zealand, it worked slightly better with the development of the self-regulatory 
arrangements between 1994 and 1999 called NZEM, MARIA and MACQS which 
merged later into the EGB. But it still was too less regulation and the Commerce Act 
1986 alone was not appropriate to control the price regime of the industry. The 
government realised that a monopolist had no incentive to offer terms more favourable 
than those it believed were legal under existing law. A vertically integrated natural 
monopoly would seek to test the limits of what is lawful by forcing an entrant to litigate 
at every point, while in the meantime consumers were denied the benefits of 
competition.519 The Association Agreements, for the most part organised by the German 
electricity industries, were completely insufficient to solve the big problems as they were 
not legally binding. Network access regulations and methods for calculating the network 
fees were set in an almost totally private environment and the control exercised by the 
Federal Cartel Office was too weak.520 
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“The fundamental flaw of the light-handed model adopted in New Zealand [and 
Germany was that it relied on the incumbent monopolist and the oligopoly in Germany 
respectively] to act in a fair and reasonable way”: 521  
 
 As a matter of public policy, a regime to control the activities of industries with natural 
monopoly characteristics which has, as its basic principle, an assumption that the monopolist will act fairly 
and reasonable, and not use its monopoly position to benefit itself at the expense of its competitors, is at 
best naïve. It is because economic theory predicts that a monopolist will act in its own self interest in 
confronting emerging competition, and is likely in the process to misuse its monopoly power that a policy 
to prevent, that a policy to prevent that possibility is needed at all.  
 
Therefore, both countries had to end the self regulation of the electricity supply 
industry at a certain point and installed an industry regulator. In New Zealand, the 
Electricity Commission took over on 1 March 2004. In Germany, the government 
delegated the power to monitor the electricity market to the Federal Network Agency on 
1 January 2006. Again, this was a requirement of a European directive which was 
implemented by the German government in form of the Energy Industry Act 2005. 
These both regulators are in many ways similar. They stand both for the effort to 
provide all classes of consumers with secure, efficient, reliable and environmentally 
sustainable electricity. But, there are some different priorities. The Electricity 
Commission has a special focus on reserve energy. Since New Zealand relies mainly on 
hydro generation, the country faces unpredictably shortages of electricity supply in times 
of drought. Furthermore, the Electricity Commission concentrates on plans to upgrade the 
grid. According to the government’s expectations, they should work with Transpower 
and grid users to facilitate priority investment in the grid. However, the Federal Network 
Agency has only limited power because it shares its authority with the state regulatory 
authorities as well as the Federal Cartel Office. The main focus of the Federal Network 
Agency lies in the supervision of the transmission and distribution networks as the access 
to them were causing several problems in the past. 
Comparing these both industry regulators seems quite hard as they are not 
working that long, especially in Germany. Furthermore, although they have similar main 
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tasks, the focus on them is different. But at the moment, New Zealand’s model seems to 
work more efficiently. The objectives are more precisely defined and the trust in the 
Electricity Commission seems to be bigger than in Germany in its Agency. The 
Electricity Commission was entrusted with issues relating to security of supply and 
transmission investment decisions, which were formerly under the control of the 
Commerce Commission, while the Federal Network Agency still has to share its power 
with the other authorities in Germany. Therefore, the Electricity Commission seems a bit 
more established. 
In recent times, the German government concentrated on enacting ordinances in 
order to support the Federal Network Agency. They concretised the regulation 
concerning access on the transmission and distribution network and on fees for this 
access. Furthermore, the KraftNAV522 came into force in July 2007 in order to facilitate 
network access for new power station projects which should boost the competition. 
Having these new rules, the Federal Network Agency can now monitor the industries’ 
compliance with the ordinances. In New Zealand, the investment in the national grid was 
the biggest concern. The NPS on Electricity Transmission was issued in September 2008, 
recognising the national significance of the national grid and giving the national 
governments a framework they could use when they had to decide on proposals for 
transmission lines. Also in September 2008, the Electricity Industry Reform Act 
Amendment Act 2008 implemented a policy change concerning the mandatory separation 
of lines and supply businesses. The government took partially back their extreme 
approach and “narrowed the scope of ownership separation requirements to focus on the 
geographic areas where lines and supply businesses are co-located”.523 
 
Having contemplated the last 25 years of both countries’ electricity market 
reforms, New Zealand has taken more efforts to reform its electricity market than 
Germany. New Zealand’s government was always years ahead in the development and 
reacted faster (e.g. Electricity Reform Act 1998) and more forcefully (e.g. mandatory 
separation of lines and supply businesses, wider power for the industry regulator). Of 
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course, New Zealand made on his way to reform its electricity market some wrong 
decisions (e.g. light handed approach or even the too extreme mandatory separation) but 
it recognised it at a certain point and initiated counteractive measures. However, 
Germany had to follow the European policy of market liberalisation. In this context, the 
government did not want to take the chance to establish fair competition on its electricity 
market but was eager to prepare its industry for pan-European market participation. The 
big electricity played and are still playing a big role in the governments decision with the 
consequence that the implementation of European directives into national law was and is 
half hearted (e.g. in 1998, only European country with regulated Third Party Access; 
industry regulator has to share its power). 
C Comparison of the Renewable Electricity Market Reforms in Both Countries  
With respect to reforms which aimed on the uptake of renewable electricity, the 
comparison between New Zealand and Germany is completely different. In this context, 
New Zealand had traditionally the much better starting point because of the dominant 
hydro generation. Therefore, New Zealand rested a little bit too long on its laurels. While 
Germany already made important decisions to start the uptake of renewable electricity in 
the 1990s, New Zealand discovered this topic not until this millennium. Germany’s 
Electricity Feed Act 1991 was the most innovative legislation concerning the uptake of 
renewables at this time. Already in 1997, Germany committed itself to implement the 
Kyoto climate protocol in order to reduce GHG emissions. New Zealand officially 
recognised climate change as a global issue not until December 2002 when Helen Clark 
signed New Zealand’s ratification of the Kyoto Protocol. Furthermore, with the election 
of the new government in 1998, Germany took more steps towards sustainable electricity. 
Eco taxes were introduced in order to fund several programmes aiming on the installation 
and extension of renewable technology systems. In 2000, the core of Germany’s efforts 
to deliver sustainable electricity was introduced: The Renewable Sources (RES) Act 
2000. At this time, objectives relating energy efficiency and renewable energy as well as 
climate change were expressed very vaguely by New Zealand’s government. The 
National Energy Efficiency and Conservation Strategy 2001 for example had no precise 
numbers with regard to the increase of renewable energy. The Resource Management Act 
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was amended not until 2004, giving greater weight to the energy efficiency and the use 
and development of renewable energy. In this year, the German government had already 
evaluated the outcomes of the RES Act 2000 critically and tried to improve flaws. It 
increased the fees for underdeveloped and therefore not much used renewable energy 
technologies, like at this time solar energy, in order to give these technologies a boost. In 
contrast, fees for wind energy installations were decreased because wind energy 
technology was well developed and established in 2004. Besides the well established 
hydro and geothermal generation, New Zealand spared its efforts regarding other 
renewable technologies. It was for example not until 2007 that the government proposed 
an investigation, to be made by the Electricity Commission of “ways in which wind 
generation could be best integrated into the current system in order to ensure that its 
maximum economic potential can be achieved”.524 
In 2007, both New Zealand and Germany developed big programmes 
concerning the climate and energy policy for the future. The New Zealand Energy 
Strategy (NZES) and its companion document the New Zealand Energy and Efficiency 
Strategy (NZEECS) were released in October 2007, proposing several measures to 
achieve the primary target that 90 per cent of electricity will generated from renewable 
sources by 2025. These measures included the establishment of an Emission Trading 
Scheme (ETS) which became law in September 2008 when the Climate Change Bill 
passed in parliament. However, Germany started the European ETS within the EU 
already in January 2005. Also plans of the NZES to use low carbon technologies such as 
Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) in New Zealand’s future have been already realised 
in Germany. In 2008, the first CCS plants were connected to the grid.  
As seen above525, the renewable energy sector has become a significant factor in 
the economy of Germany. Around quarter of a million are working in this industry. In 
order to continue supporting this sector, the German government alone spends more than 
NZ $ 300 million every year for the research and development of new renewable energy 
technologies. Furthermore, the government focused on energy efficiency. It has 
substantially expanded the CO2 Building Renovation Programme since early 2006 – 
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making around NZ $ 2.8billion per year available for the period 2006-2008, in the form 
of low-interest loans and grants and tax concessions. This quadrupled the programme's 
previous budgets. The government's first economic stimulus programme of November 
2008 adopted further funding of an additional NZ $ 6 billion for 2009-2011.526 
These are unimaginable sums for New Zealand which agreed in the NZEECS to 
NZ $ 184 million in funding for a number of programmes over a period of five years.  
Envisaged programmes in the NZEECS like smart metering have become in 
Germany already reality through the Integrated Energy and Climate Programme (IECP) 
which the German government adopted in December 2007. With this programme, the 
government elaborated a comprehensive package of future acts, ordinances and measures. 
In this connection, the new RES Act 2009 is especially to point out. The government 
again adjusted its aim upwards. Now, 30 per cent of electricity should be generated from 
renewable energy sources by 2020. Furthermore, the German government wants to focus 
on offshore wind energy which has in their opinion a great potential. Therefore, several 
measures should be taken to support the ambitious plans of installing offshore wind 
turbines with a combined capacity of up to 25,000 MW by 2030 (e.g. involvement of the 
Federal Ministry of Transport, undersea cables).  
In the meantime, New Zealand is still developing a NPS for Renewable 
Electricity Generation under the Resource Management Act. This NPS shall give “clear 
statutory recognition of the national benefits of renewable electricity generation, and 
therefore provide generators with a degree of certainty that decision-makers will give 
appropriate consideration to these benefits when considering plan provisions and 
applications”. 527  This step is very necessary because not even a fifth of generation 
capacity consented under the RMA was renewable between 1991 and 2006. In contrast, 
Germany amended its federal building codes already in 1998 in the way that the 
installation of wind power plants and hydropower plants were facilitated immensely, of 
course, with the detriment of the asparagus effect 528 . But due to the by the IECP 
initialised support strategy for re-powering wind turbines this effect shall be removed. 
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Concluding, New Zealand has been a long time a role model all over the world 
delivering renewable electricity in a high percentage to its people. But they missed the 
trend in the 1990s. In contrast, Germany’s environmental policy was very progressive 
from the start. The fees for the feed in of renewable electricity to the grid are nowadays 
copied by many countries. Furthermore, the government started various programmes to 
boost every form of renewable electricity generation. In addition, the RES Act was 
amended in order to support underdeveloped renewable energy technologies with higher 
fees. For the future, the IECP and its measures seems more promising than the NZES and 
NZEECS because there is more money, work and experience involved in the German 
renewable energy sector than in New Zealand. In 2008 and in the beginning of 2009, 
many key points of this IECP have been realised already in Germany (e.g. smart metering 
in 2008 or the RES Act 2009 on 1 January 2009), while in New Zealand important 
measures like the NPS for Renewable Electricity Generation are still under progress. 
Being an isolated country, it is also understandable that New Zealand’s biggest concern 
seems to be security of supply. In this connection, the new elected government around 
John Key is expected to soften the impact of the planned ETS (postponing it a year or 
more) and to lift Labour’s 10-year ban on new gas or coal-fired power stations.529 But this 
means that New Zealand is taking a step back towards delivering sustainable electricity.  
D  Result 
Overall, Germany seems to be on a better way to tackle the big challenges of the 
21st century in the electricity sector. Due to its exemplary and progressive environment 
policy it seems to be prepared and willing to deliver its people a big amount of renewable 
electricity in the future. However, this is only a snap-shot in the fast moving electricity 
sector. And New Zealand has shown in the past that it can reform its electricity market in 
a fast and forceful way. 530 In addition, it remains to be seen whether the big economic 
crisis will have a negative impact on sustainability. 
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